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ABSTRACT
Hsuan-Wei Lee: Dynamics and Social Clustering on
Coevolving Networks
(Under the direction of Peter J. Mucha)
Complex networks oﬀer a powerful conceptual framework for the description and analysis of
many real world systems. Many processes have been formed into networks in the area of random
graphs, and the dynamics of networks have been studied. These two mechanisms combined creates
an adaptive or coevolving network – a network whose edges change adaptively with respect to its
states, bringing a dynamical interaction between the state of nodes and the topology of the network.
We study three binary-state dynamics in the context of opinion formation, disease propagation
and evolutionary games of networks. We try to understand how the network structure aﬀects the
status of individuals, and how the behavior of individuals, in turn, aﬀects the overall network
structure. We focus our investigation on social clustering, since this is one of the central properties
of social networks, arising due to the ubiquitous tendency among individuals to connect to friends of
a friend, and can significantly impact a coevolving network system. Introducing rewiring models
with transitivity reinforcement, we investigate how the mechanism aﬀects network dynamics and the
clustering structure of the networks.
We perform Monte Carlo simulations to explore the parameter space of each model. By applying
improved compartmental formalism methods, including approximate master equations, our semi-
analytical approximation generally provide accurate predictions of the final states of the networks,
degree distributions, and evolution of fundamental quantities. Diﬀerent levels of semi-analytical
estimation are compared.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
1.1 Networks Overview
We are surrounded by systems that are extremely complicated. The emergence of network science
is a brilliant demonstration that interdisciplinary science can take up the challenge of studying such
systems [9, 110]. These systems are collectively called complex systems, capturing the fact that it is
diﬃcult to derive their collective behavior from a knowledge of the system’s components. Network
science deals with complexity by summarizing complex systems as components and capturing the
interplay between them. Despite or even perhaps because of such simplifications, informative
discoveries can and have been made. A network based mathematical and statistical approach is
extremely desirable for such endeavors as it is a formalism allowing one to couple microscopic and
macroscopic dynamics. The following is a sample of some of the applications in which network
science are becoming increasingly significant.
Biological processes are often represented in the form of graphs or networks, and a biological
network is any network that applies to biological systems [3, 12, 78]. A biological system could
be represented in a framework of networks consisting of a set of nodes representing biological
entries and edges denoting relationships between pairs of nodes. Biological networks provide a
mathematical model of connections found in ecological, evolutionary, and physiological studies, such
as protein-protein interaction networks, metabolic pathways, gene regulatory networks, cell signaling
networks, neural networks, and food webs. The study of biological networks, their construction,
mathematical and statistical analysis, and visualization are significant tasks in life science today.
The fabric of our environments and societies is held together by physical systems of various kinds,
such as power grid systems, water supply, sewage disposal, telecommunications and transportation
systems [2, 6, 17]. A transportation network is a realization of a spatial network, referring to a
structure which allows either vehicular movement or flow of some commodity, with a set of nodes
and links that represent the infrastructure or supply side of the transportation. Perhaps the most
historically famous problem at the beginning of this field is the Seven Bridges of Königsberg; its
negative resolution by Leonhard Euler in 1736 laid the foundations of graph theory and prefigured
the idea of topology and network structure. Examples of transport networks are roads and streets,
railways, aqueducts, pipes, and power lines.
Social network analysis examines the structure of relationships and interactions between social
entities, such as individuals and organizations [36, 76]. The analysis of social networks is an inherently
interdisciplinary academic field which emerged from sociology, political science, social psychology,
business and economics, statistics, and graph theory. Within the social sciences, network theory
has had an unprecedented impact. Social network analysis is now one of the major paradigms in
contemporary sociology and is also implemented in other social and formal sciences.
1.2 Networks with Complex Structural Properties
A network is simply a collection of connected objects. The structure of a network is usually
described by a given set of nodes and edges. In mathematics, networks are often referred to as graphs
and in the scientific literature, the terms network and graph are frequently used interchangeably.
Suppose a graph G is a network having N nodes and L edges (or links), we can label all the nodes and
edges in the network to be {n}Nn=1 and {l}Ll=1. The links of a network can be directed or undirected.
For directed (undirected) networks a link corresponds to an ordered (unordered) pair of nodes. For
directed and undirected networks of N nodes without multiple connections, the network structure
can be represented by an N ⇥N adjacency matrix A of ones and zeros, where a one indicates the
presence of a connection and each entry Amn is nonzero if and only if a link exists from node m to
node n. In a weighted network, the entries of Amn can be non-unitary.
Network models serve as a foundation to understanding interactions within empirical complex
networks. The following are some types of networks that have been well studied: regular, lattices in
low dimensional spaces, random graphs such as Erdős-Rényi model [39], Watts-Strogatz small world
model [154], and Barabási-Albert preferential attachment model [10] and so on. Various random
network formation models produce structures that may be compared to real-world complex networks.
Here we introduce some basic network concepts and properties that are fundamental in social
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network analysis.
• Degree, average degree and degree distribution - Degree (or connectivity in graph
theory) is the number of edges that connect a node. We denote with kn the degree of the nth
node in the network. In an undirected network the total number of links, L, can be expressed
as the sum of the node degrees:
L =
1
2
NX
n=1
kn.
There is a 1/2 in front of the sum because every edge is counted twice. Average degree is an
important quantity of a network, and in an undirected network it is defined as:
hki = 1
N
NX
n=1
kn =
2L
N
.
The degree distribution pk of a network is defined to be the fraction of nodes in the network
with degree k. This pk is a probability, hence,
1X
k=0
pk = 1.
Note that one also has
hki =
1X
k=0
kpk.
• Node centrality - Network centrality is the answer to the question "What characterizes an
important vertex?" The word "importance" has a wide number of meanings, leading to many
diﬀerent definitions of centrality [23]. Centrality concepts first originated in social network
analysis, and many of the terms used to measure centrality reflect their sociological origin.
The following are some types of network centralities: degree centrality, closeness centrality,
betweenness centrality, eigenvector centrality, Katz centrality. In social networks, nodes with
high centrality may play important roles in the overall composition of a network.
• Clustering coeﬃcient - A clustering coeﬃcient is a measure of the degree to which nodes in
a graph tend to cluster together. Evidence suggests that in most real-world networks, and in
particular social networks, nodes tend to create tightly knit groups characterized by a relatively
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high density of ties, or put it another way, friends of friends are often one’s friends. The
following are the two common definitions of clustering coeﬃcient.
The global clustering coeﬃcient [151] is based on triplets of nodes. A triplet consists of three
connected nodes. A triangle therefore includes three closed triplets, one centered on each of
the nodes. The global clustering coeﬃcient is defined as:
C =
3⇥ number of triangles
number of connected triplets of nodes
=
number of closed triplets
number of connected triplets of nodes
.
The local clustering coeﬃcient [154] captures the degree to which the neighbors of a given node
link to each other, that is, it quantifies how close its neighbors are to being a clique (complete
graph). For a node n with degree kn the local clustering coeﬃcient is defined as
Cn =
2Ln
kn(kn   1)
where Ln denotes the number of edges between the kn neighbors of node n. Furthermore, the
degree of clustering of a whole network is represented by the average clustering coeﬃcient hCi,
and it is defined as
hCi = 1
N
NX
n=1
Cn.
Note that all the global, local and average clustering coeﬃcients are between 0 and 1. The
clustering coeﬃcient is also known in social network analysis as transitivity. In this thesis,
we consider the global clustering coeﬃcient in Chapter 2 and the local clustering coeﬃcient
in Chapter 3, and for simplicity, the clustering coeﬃcient in this thesis means the diﬀerent
clustering coeﬃcients accordingly.
• Subgraph Motifs - In social and real-world networks there are often some small structures
that are more frequently shown than expectation. Network motifs are sub-graphs that repeat
themselves in various networks [105]. Each of these sub-graphs, defined by a particular pattern
of interactions between vertices, may reflect a framework in which specific functions are
achieved eﬃciently. Motifs are of notable importance primarily because they may reveal
functional properties. They have recently gathered much attention as a useful concept to
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uncover topological design principles of complex networks.
• Community Structure - A network is said to have community structure if the nodes of
the network can be easily grouped into sets of nodes such that each set of nodes is densely
connected internally, or, subsets of nodes within which node and node connections are denser,
but between which connections are less dense. In the study of social networks, it is common to
see people have the same traits or experience such as race, ethnicity, location, income, hobby,
or ideology would form groups or communities. This homophily eﬀect makes individuals have
a stronger bond with similar others, and this eﬀect is also widely studied in social networks.
In network science, detecting community structures in diﬀerent levels is also a very significant
topic of research [50, 113].
1.3 Network Dynamics and Coevolving Networks
When studying a dynamical process, one is concerned with its behavior as a function of time,
space, and its parameters. Real networks are not simply lists of nodes where some pairs are linked,
and others aren’t. Nodes may have locations, opinions, aﬃliations, and demographic characteristics
that change over time; links between them have timing, durations, capacities, and so on. Hence,
nodes may come and go and edges may crash and recover. Substantial progress has been made both
in the classification of real and synthetic networks and in the study of dynamical models of networks.
The phrase "network dynamics" can be interpreted as the study of dynamical systems on or
of networks [111, 125]. The notion of dynamical networks has so far referred to either one of two
distinct concepts. "Dynamics on networks" refers to the diﬀerent classes of processes taking place
on networks, e.g. biological contagion [16], social contagion [75], coupled oscillators [143], diﬀusion
[91], percolation [22], etc. The eﬀectiveness of such processes is deeply influenced by the topology of
the network. On the other hand, "dynamics of networks" mainly refers to various phenomena that
happen to the network structure to bring about certain changes over time in the topology of the
network. The Barabási-Albert preferential attachment model, interpreted such that the addition of
each new node is a time step, is an example of this kind of dynamics. New nodes could join the
network and edges could be formed or deleted.
Therefore, it has become clear that properties in dynamical systems such as stability, bifurcation,
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robustness, periodicity, phase transition, etc. could be discussed on and of the network dynamics.
And the study of dynamical processes on and of networks are among some of the hottest theoretical
challenges for complex network research.
Static networks are networks with fixed topology that do not change with time. The static
network has been studied widely, and many phenomena are also explored. However, on networks
with static topology, the coupling of topology and information flow is only a one-way road. The
states of nodes do not aﬀect the structure of such static networks.
Coevolving or adaptive networks are obtained by combining the dynamics on and of networks
[59, 60, 74]. A coevolving network is a network whose network topology and states of nodes coevolve,
that is, its links change according to its states, and vice versa, resulting in a dynamic interplay
between the state and the structure of the network. Most networks in real life are coevolving networks
to some extent. Hence, lots of examples in coevolving networks models could be applied to diﬀerent
fields of science. The study of coevolving networks is a fast growing topic in epidemiology, social and
economic networks, and biological networks. Perhaps the most typical example is in epidemiology,
with an infectious disease spreading on a network. To control the epidemic, an infected individual
might be quarantined, hence, the local topology of the node is changed by losing its susceptible
neighbors [101]. In the study of terrorist networks [40], not only are the networks temporal, the
number of links one node has is strongly dependent on its activeness at a specific time.
In this thesis, we will study three diﬀerent models of coevolving networks and explore the
interaction between states of nodes and structure of networks.
1.4 Analytical Methods
Dynamics in real life are extremely complicated, and it is almost impossible to analyze or predict
the outcome without simplification. The framework and analytical methods oﬀered by statistical
physics could allow us to explore the dynamics of various systems using simplified yet, insightful
models. To capture the dynamics in mathematical models, and more specifically, networks, we need
to reply on some level of approximation. Various degrees of simplification have diﬀerent analytical or
computational cost, and yield diﬀerent accuracy. Because of such simplifications, mathematical and
statistical inference and informative discoveries can and have been made. In the study of this thesis,
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we focus on the study of binary-state dynamics on networks, that is, a node (or, as we will encounter
in Chapter 6, a link) could only take one of two possible states, e.g. susceptible-infected-susceptible
(SIS) dynamics on networks. Here we introduce the analytical methods we use in this thesis to study
the dynamics of our models.
In statistical physics, mean field (MF) theory studies the behavior of large and complex stochastic
models by investigating a simpler model of average interactions [11, 15, 18, 115]. Such models simply
assume the environment of the system is well-mixed, and the eﬀect of all the other individuals on any
given individual is approximated by a single averaged eﬀect, thus reducing a many-body problem to
a one-body problem. In binary-state dynamics, the MF method only uses one diﬀerential equation
to describe the dynamics, since the other one is redundant (by conservation of the total number of
nodes, the fraction in one state minus the fraction in the other). Mean field theory simplifies the
system dynamics hugely by only focusing on the change of quantities of diﬀerent classes, whereas this
method ignores the network topology and may not be accurate when systems have more complicated
structures. Usually, this method works well when the network is sparse and locally tree-like, which
is often interpreted to require that there are fewer cliques inside the network. However, there are
some studies that show mean field theory can yield a good approximation of the network dynamics
(see, e.g., [99] for an investigation of the accuracy of heterogeneous mean field theory, wherein the
variables describing the system capture the fractions of nodes in each state for each distinct degree).
Pair approximation (PA) is an improvement for the mean field method [35, 88, 142, 146]. This
method keeps track of the quantities of pairs or the frequencies of neighbor-site pairs of each possible
type in the systems. For example, in the SIS dynamics in a system, one could follow the quantities
of S nodes, SS, and SI edges (other information is redundant) to study the dynamics. Hence, in
binary-state dynamics, the PA method uses three diﬀerential equations to describe the dynamics.
Pair approximation has often provided accurate qualitative information about spatial stochastic
models for epidemic, population, and evolutionary dynamics especially when the network topology is
not complicated. Generally speaking, a large network essentially has an infinite hierarchical system,
and the information of one level of approximation depends on its next level. Mean Field theory
makes a closure approximation for the numbers of edges (that is, pairs) in terms of the number
of nodes. Similarly, the diﬀerential equations of pairs depend on the densities of triplets, so Pair
Approximation assumes a closure for the number of connected triples in terms of the numbers of
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pairs, closing the system so that the densities of triplets are not explicitly tracked.
Master equations are used to portray the dynamics of a system that can be modeled as being
in exactly one of the states at any given time, and where switching between states is treated
probabilistically. The equations are usually a set of diﬀerential equations for the variation over time
of the probabilities that the system occupies each of the diﬀerent states. The approximate master
equations (AME) framework [52, 53, 90, 97] on networks considers both the state and degree of
nodes and the states of their immediate neighbors, generating a system of diﬀerential equations to
model the co-evolution of the dynamics of states and network structure. For example, in the SIS
dynamics, one can write down the diﬀerential equations of Sk,m, that is, the change of an S node that
has degree k and m infected neighbors. Similarly, one can also write down the Ik,m compartment.
In binary-state dynamics, the AME method generates O(k2max) number of diﬀerential equations,
where kmax denotes the maximum degree cutoﬀ of a system. The AME method usually provides a
very accurate approximation of the evolution of networks, including near the critical point of the
dynamics. Moreover, the AME method performs well in both static and coevolving networks, since
more equations are being used to gain this accuracy.
The diﬀerential equations of these systems keep track of the quantities of diﬀerent classes of nodes,
and in PA and AME, also their neighbors’ states. The MF, PA, and AME above are categorized
as node classification methods. Beyond the method of AME, [159] provides a link-based formalism
method that includes the information not only of nodes but every set of links. Again in the SIS
dynamics, for an SI edge, the classification is done by writing it as SijIkl, that is, the S end has i
neighbors, j of them are infected, and the I end has k neighbors, l of them are infected. The other
systems could be formulated similarly. The link-based formalism method could provide slightly more
accurate results compared with AME. However, this would also raise the computing costs to O(k4max)
number of diﬀerential equations, where kmax denotes the maximum degree cutoﬀ of a system. This
method also provides subtly detailed information of degree correlation, and it could give a better
approximation when the dynamics, say the spreading or rewiring process, is based on the degree of
nodes. Since the method of AME has been slightly more widely used and its computational cost
is more reasonable, here in the thesis we only use AME as our framework, though more extension
could be explored in the future.
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1.5 Overview of Thesis
• Chapter 1 - In Ch. 1, we have provided an overlook and a broad introduction to network
science. We defined the scope of our study – coevolving networks in the field of network
dynamics. A survey of dynamics on and of networks was provided, and diﬀerent level of
analytical approximations have been briefly discussed. The importance and universality of
coevolving networks makes such study an important topic of complex systems.
• Chapter 2 - In Ch. 2, we provide a new transitivity reinforcement voter model. Rather
than rewiring randomly, there is a certain probability that a node rewires to its distance two
neighbors, close a triangle, and the clustering coeﬃcient of the network increases. We study
this new model on an initially Erdős-Rényi G(N, l) random graph and also approximate the
dynamics by using the method of approximate master equations. We investigate the parameter
spaces, clustering coeﬃcient, degree distribution in the stationary states, and the network
evolution.
• Chapter 3 - In Ch. 3, we provide a new clustering reinforcement model of the SIS dynamics.
Rather than rewiring randomly, there is a certain probability that a node rewires to its distance
two neighbors, and close a triangle. We study this new model on diﬀerent structures of networks,
and also approximate the dynamics by using the method of approximate master equations. We
investigate the parameter spaces, the disease prevalence level, clustering coeﬃcients, degree
distribution in the stationary states, network evolution and finally, provide a bifurcation
analysis.
• Chapter 4 - In Ch. 4 we introduce a partner switching model in evolutionary games on
networks. We explore the parameter space and study the dynamics thoroughly. By using
the method of approximate master equations, we provide better estimation than existing
methods. Furthermore, we use this semi-approximation technique to approximate the evolution
of dynamics and degree distribution in stationary states. Lastly, we discuss the final cooperative
level in this partner switching model.
• Chapter 5 - Motivated by results in Ch. 4, we study another version of the partner switching
model in Ch. 5, expanding the partner states that can be switched. We perform similar
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investigations as in Ch. 4. The network evolution and the parameter spaces are explored.
Also, the method of approximate master equations provides a good estimation of the network
dynamics.
• Chapter 6 - Motivated by results in Ch. 4 and Ch. 5, we study a theoretical extension of the
partner switching model in Ch. 6. In the link-based network dynamics we study here, a node
could play diﬀerent strategies (or states) with its diﬀerent neighbors. We provide simulations
of the new model and discuss the possibilities of various levels of approximations.
• Chapter 7 - We close this thesis with some concluding discussion and several directions of
future work are indicated.
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CHAPTER 2
Voter Model and Social Clustering on Complex Networks
2.1 Background Information
Almost all people have opinions about numerous topics, from weather, sports, environment,
fashion, and the society to politics. These judgments can be either the result of sober reflection
or, through the process of information spreading, formed through interactions with others that
hold views on given issues. A large scale of media and social networking applications have made it
possible for news, innovations, opinions and rumors to spread quickly, which aﬀect and change our
daily lifestyle significantly. People depend on others and the environment to shape their views of the
world. To apprehend the process of opinion formation, it demands an exploration of the interaction
between the structure of the social network and the dynamics that aﬀects the system and human
behavior.
Many researchers are dedicated to understanding the implication of diﬀerent mechanisms and
network structures and their interactions. Moreover, investigation of the opinion leaders, or zealots
[98, 147], and external fields [79] has been implemented. Not only on synthetic networks, empirical
[28, 153] and experimental [32, 109] studies have also contributed to the understanding of opinion
dynamics. For example, social media such as Twitter, Facebook and Instagram have become
important to lots of people’s daily lives and are essential to the spread of opinions and information
[5, 139]. Furthermore, television and internet ads also play crucial roles in elections and businesses
[26, 153]. Hence, it is very natural to model, quantify and even give predictions to these social
contagion dynamics in diﬀerent settings, scopes, and mechanisms.
Various opinion dynamics models on complex networks have been brought up and investigated.
In the setting of the threshold model [42, 55, 57, 152], a node turns active/infected if a suﬃcient
number or ratio of its neighbors are already active/infected. The threshold model has been widely
used in the study of fads, marketing, elections, disease propagation and contact process models.
Take the spreading of a fad, the size of the population getting it, its duration, the dynamics of
spreading, and the interplay of network structure are usually the topics people study. The model is
essentially asymmetric as when two nodes communicate only the inactive/susceptible node becomes
active/infected thus resulting in a spread like dynamics.
The naming game is another model of opinion dynamics [13, 14, 95, 158]. It was first introduced
in the context of linguistics and communications. This model describes how a global agreement or
convention can automatically emerge in a population of artificial agents that interact locally with
their peers, without any central control [85]. Hence, the formation of a language in a society could
be studied. For example, in the context of a group of robots or sensor networks, the naming game
model imitates the emergence of common communication schemes.
Models of continuous states of opinion dynamics have also been extensively investigated. In the
bounded confidence model, opinions are not anymore binary or discrete, but it could be extended
to a spectrum of values. First introduced by Krause and Hegselmann [67] and Deﬀuant et al. [30]
independently, this is a probabilistic model for the evolution of continuous-valued opinions within a
finite group of peers, and this could also be generalized to a network setting. The concept of bounded
confidence is that artificial agents only interact if they share opinions close enough to each other.
People study the emergence of the consensuses, the size of them, their duration, and distribution or
the spatial properties of the various communities [92, 93].
A simpler model, the voter model is independently brought by Cliﬀord and Sudbury [29], and by
Holley and Liggett [70]. This is a mathematical model of opinion formation in which individuals, or
voters, play as nodes in a complex network; each voter has an opinion at each time, and a randomly
chosen voter accepts the opinion of one of its neighbors. It is also a stochastic process that is a
peculiar type of interacting particle system. The voter model is a sequential dynamical system, and
it is also similar to disease propagation and contact process. At random times, a random node or
link is selected, and the voter’s opinion is changed in agreement with some probabilistic rule. To
be more specific, pick one node and choose a neighbor of this node, the neighbor’s opinion could
transfer to the chosen node following some stochastic rule. Or the chosen voter could see his or
her neighbors’ majority or minority opinion and act accordingly. Therefore, network topologies
also plays an important role in the dynamics. Theoretical eﬀorts have been devoted to fathom and
quantify features in the dynamics of spread of opinions or contagions considering various local and
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global structural attributes of the underlying complex systems [133, 138].
The voter model has been studied on many network topologies, and the underlaying networks
could be static or adaptive. Investigations have been performed in networks with homogeneous and
heterogeneous degree distributions [137], scale-free networks [24], small world networks [25], and
multilayer networks [31]. In coevolving networks, networks structures could change depending on
the states of nodes, usually by the mechanism of rewiring [19, 34, 71, 116, 135]. Individuals could
have their preference to stay with others sharing the same opinions with them and break their links
with people with discordant opinions. Although mainly people study only binary-state dynamics,
lots of phenomenon such as graph fission and community structure could be explored.
In the study of opinion formation on complex networks, one of the critical components has
been missing: the influence of clustering in coevolving networks on the resulting dynamics and
network structure. Clustering is one of the central properties of social networks, arising from the
ubiquitous tendency among individuals to connect to friends of a friend, and can significantly impact
a coevolving network system. The role of clustering and environment could play a vital role in
the network dynamics [96]. Random graph models and random rewiring processes usually lead to
networks with zero clustering coeﬃcients, which is a result not very realistic in social networks.
Hence, in our study, we want to find a simple model that could lead to nontrivial local clustering of
networks and investigate how this mechanism could lead to diﬀerent network dynamics.
The outline of the Chapter is as follows. In Section 2, we define our model and in Section 3,
we derive our semi-analytical method. In Section 4, we compare the simulation results with the
estimation we obtained. We investigate the rewiring parameter space, the final state of consensuses,
the clustering coeﬃcient, the degree distribution, and the comparison of simulation and semi-
analytical results. Finally, in Section 5, we give our conclusions and some further remarks.
2.2 Model Description
In this Chapter, we introduce and study a new model of opinion formation with clustering
reinforcement. Our goal is to try to build a mechanism that fits one of the most fundamental
observation of social network: friends of friends’ friend are often ones’ friends. We incorporate the
clustering eﬀect into the evolution of network, that is, we want to construct a mechanism such that
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the clustering coeﬃcient of network increases as the opinions are formed. Therefore, we introduce a
simple preferential attachment to an existing rewire-to-random opinion formation model. Under our
new model, there is a certain probability that if a rewiring happens, a node rewires to its neighbors’
neighbor, a triangle is closed, and the local clustering extent is thus increased.
To begin with, consider a network G(N, l), that is, a network with N nodes and l edges. Each
node in the network has an opinion, or state, attached to it: 0 or 1. We want to investigate how
these two opinions change with the evolution of networks. At each time step, we pick a discordant
edge, or an edge with diﬀerent states at its two ends. With probability 1  ↵, a node at the end
of the discordant edge would change its state to imitate the state on the other end. We call this
process voting. With probability ↵, a node at the end of the discordant edge dismisses its neighbor
and rewires to some node in the network. We call this process rewiring. When the rewiring process
happens, there is also a probability   that the node rewires to its neighbors’ neighbor, or the distance
two neighbor, otherwise, the node would rewire to a random node in the network. Hence, in our new
model, when we update a discordant edge, the voting process happens with probability 1  ↵, one
node rewires to its distance two neighbor with probability ↵ , and one node rewires to a random
node in the network with probability ↵(1   ). Hence, whenever a rewiring to neighbor’s neighbor
happens (with probability ↵ ), a triangle is closed, and the clustering coeﬃcient of the network
increases. We illustrate this process in Figure 2.1.
We simulate networks with total number of nodesN = 100, 000, total number of edges l = 800, 000,
and hence the mean degree of the network is fixed to be hki = 4. Initially, we start the networks to
be an Erdős-Rényi G(N, l) random graph model, that is, a network is chosen uniformly at random
from the collection of all graphs which have N nodes and l edges. Hence with N large enough, we
could approximate the initial degree distribution of the networks by a Poisson distribution,
pk =
hkike hki
k!
.
Also, initially, we let 50% of nodes have opinion 0 and 50% of nodes have opinion 1. Then we
start the opinion formation with clustering reinforcement process. At each time step, a discordant
edge is picked and updated. The whole dynamic stops if there are no discordant edges in the network,
and we say the network reaches its consensus state or final state. Hence, the network structure and
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the state of nodes coevolve during the evolution of the network and the network stops changing until
there are no discordant edges. Note that during the evolution of the network, both the total number
of nodes N and the total number of edges l are fixed to be constants.
br
Figure 2.1: Illustration of the clustering reinforcement mechanism. At each time step, a discordant
edge is picked. There is probability ↵  for one node rewires to its neighbor’s neighbor and closes
a triangle. In this figure, white nodes are with opinion 0 and gray nodes are with opinion 1. A
discordant edge XY is picked and node Y dismisses X and it rewires to its distance two neighbor
W .
2.3 Semi-analytical Methods
In the voter model, consider the eﬀect of the   term, the probability of a node rewiring to its
neighbor’s neighbor. Now a node has probability ↵  rewiring to its neighbors’ neighbor. Let N0
be the number of vertices with opinion 0, and N1 be the number of vertices with opinion 1. Nij is
the number of oriented i-j links, and Nijk is the number of oriented triples x-y-z having states i, j
and k. Note that in this notation, N01 = N10 and N00 counts every unoriented 0-0 link twice. Let
Sk,m(t) and Ik,m(t) be the fraction of nodes with opinion 0 and 1, respectively, of degree k which
have m neighbors of opinion 1.
We follow [53] to develop diﬀerential equations describing the evolution of the objects Sk,m(t)
and Ik,m(t). First we note that Sk,m(t) and Ik,m(t) obey a few conservation laws: conservation of
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nodes leads to X
k,m
Sk,m(t) +
X
k,m
Ik,m(t) = 1,
and conservation of edges leads to
✓X
k,m
Sk,m(t)
◆2
+
✓X
k,m
Ik,m(t)
◆2
+ 2
X
k,m
Sk,m(t)
X
k,m
Ik,m(t) = hki.
If an ✏ amount of nodes are made to hold opinion 1 at random at t = 0 then the initial conditions
for Sk,m and Ik,m are given by
Sk,m(0) = (1  ✏)pk(0)
✓
k
m
◆
✏m(1  ✏)k m,
and
Ik,m(0) = ✏pk(0)
✓
k
m
◆
✏m(1  ✏)k m.
Where pk(0) is the initial degree distribution, we assume it to be a Poisson distribution as our
starting topology is a random network, and we have set ✏ = 0.5, i.e., half of the nodes hold opinion 0
and the other half holds opinion 1.
To write a diﬀerential equation governing the evolution of Sk,m we will require to know the
probability of center S having a neighbor’s neighbor (distance 2 neighbor) with opinion 0. We
represent this probability by P (nn0 | Sk,m) and estimate it as:
P (nn0 | Sk,m) = m  1k   1 ·
l10
1
2 l11 + l10
+
k  m
k   1 ·
1
2 l00
1
2 l00 + l01
.
Similarly we can obtain this probability for P (nn0 | Sk,m+1)
P (nn0 | Sk,m+1) = mk   1 ·
l10
1
2 l11 + l10
+
k  m  1
k   1 ·
1
2 l00
1
2 l00 + l01
.
We have the following ODE governing the time evolution of the Sk,m compartment:
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ddt
Sk,m = ↵ 
   ⇥1 + P (nn0 | Sk,m)⇤mSk,m + P (nn0 | Sk,m+1)(m+ 1)Sk,m+1 + (m+ 1)Sk+1,m+1 
+ ↵(1   )   (2  u)mSk,m + (1  u)(m+ 1)Sk,m+1 + (m+ 1)Sk+1,m+1 
+ ↵ 
n
  ⇥ m
k
· l101
211 + l10
  · l01
N0
+
 k  m
k
·
1
2 l00
1
2 l00 + l01
  · l01
N0
⇤ · Sk,m
  ⇥ m
k
·
1
211
1
211 + l10
  · l10
N1
+
 k  m
k
· l011
2 l00 + l01
  · l10
N1
⇤ · Sk,m
+
⇥ m  1
k   1 ·
1
211
1
211 + l10
  · l10
N1
+
 k  m
k   1 ·
l01
1
2 l00 + l01
  · l10
N1
⇤ · Sk 1,m 1
+ [
  m
k   1 ·
l10
1
211 + l10
  · l01
N0
+
 k  m  1
k   1 ·
1
2 l00
1
2 l00 + l01
  · l01
N0
⇤ · Sk 1,mo
+ ↵(1   ) l01
N
   2Sk,m + Sk 1,m 1 + Sk 1,m 
+ (1  ↵)  mSk,m + (k  m)Ik,m 
+ (1  ↵)    s(k  m)Sk,m +  s(k  m+ 1)Sk,m 1    smSk,m +  s(m+ 1)Sk,m+1 
(2.1)
where
 s =
P
k,mmSk,mP
k,m Sk,m
=
⌧001
l00
 s =
P
k,m(k  m)2Ik,mP
k,m(k  m)Ik,m
=
⌧010
l01
+ 1,
i.e.,  s is the number of 1 neighbors of a 0-0 edge and  s gives the number of 0 neighbors of the 1 at
the end of a 0-1 edge and the +1 counts the 0 on the conditioning edge.
In a Sk,m class, the probability that the center has a neighbor’s neighbor (the distance two
neighbor) with opinion 0 is estimated by P (nn0 | Sk,m). Similarly, in a Sk,m+1 class, the probability
that the center has a neighbor’s neighbor with opinion 0 is estimated by P (nn0 | Sk,m+1). Here  s
is the estimated number of 1 neighbors of a 0-0 edge. Moreover,  s gives the estimated number of 0
neighbors of the 1 at the end of a 0-1 edge and the +1 counts the 0 on the conditioning edge.
Following the same procedure as stated above for Sk,m, we obtain the following diﬀerential
equation governing the evolution of the Ik,m:
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ddt
Ik,m = ↵ { [1 + P (nn1|Ik,m)](k  m)Ik,m + P (nn1|Ik,m 1)(k  m+ 1)Ik,m 1 + (k  m+ 1)Ik+1,m}
+ ↵(1   )   (1 + u)(k  m)Ik,m + u(k  m+ 1)Ik,m 1 + (k  m+ 1)Ik+1,m 
+ ↵ 
n
  ⇥ m
k
· l101
211 + l10
  · l01
N0
+
 k  m
k
·
1
2 l00
1
2 l00 + l01
  · l01
N0
⇤ · Ik,m
  ⇥ m
k
·
1
211
1
211 + l10
  · l10
N1
+
 k  m
k
· l011
2 l00 + l01
  · l10
N1
⇤ · Ik,m
+
⇥ m  1
k   1 ·
1
211
1
211 + l10
  · l10
N1
+
 k  m
k   1 ·
l01
1
2 l00 + l01
  · l10
N1
⇤ · Ik 1,m 1
+
⇥  m
k   1 ·
l10
1
211 + l10
  · l01
N0
+
 k  m  1
k   1 ·
1
2 l00
1
2 l00 + l01
  · l01
N0
⇤ · Ik 1,mo
+ ↵(1   ) l01
N
   2Ik,m + Ik 1,m 1 + Ik 1,m 
+ (1  ↵){ (k  m)Ik,m +mSk,m}
+ (1  ↵){  i(k  m)Ik,m +  i(k  m+ 1)Ik,m 1    imIk,m +  i(m+ 1)Ik,m+1} (2.2)
where
P (nn1 | Ik,m) = mk   1 ·
1
211
1
211 + l10
+
k  m  1
k   1 ·
l01
1
2 l00 + l01
P (nn1 | Ik,m 1) = m  1k   1 ·
1
211
1
211 + l10
+
k  m
k   1 ·
l01
1
2 l00 + l01
.
To understand the diﬀerential equations, take an Sk,m class of Equation (2.1). The first line of
the right-hand side represents the center actively rewiring to a distance two neighbor, the second
line means the center actively rewires to any node in the network, the third to sixth lines are the
case the center is passively rewired by its distance two neighbors, the seventh line means the center
is passively rewired by any node in the network. Finally, the last two lines are the case no rewiring
happens and the nodes just simply update their opinions.
There are 2(kmax + 1)2 equations of the Sk,m(t) and Ik,m(t) governing ODEs, where kmax is the
maximum degree a node could have in the system. MATLAB’s ode45 solver was used starting with
a Poisson degree distribution with averaged degree   = 4. We set kmax = 20 and we observe that the
results are not appreciably aﬀected by increasing kmax. The illustration of some rewiring processes
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is shown in Figure 2.2.
( (
( (
Figure 2.2: Suppose the center is a node with opinion 0. The following are illustrations of the center
passively rewired by diﬀerent distance two neighbors: (a) 0 rewires to node X, a class of Sk,m, (b) 1
rewires to node Y, a class of Sk,m, (c) 0 rewires to node Z, a class of Sk 1,m and (d) 1 rewires to
node W, a class of Sk 1,m 1. The case of the center with opinion 1 is similar.
2.4 Numerical Experimentation and Discussion
2.4.1 Consensus States of the Networks
Results in this subsection were led and provided by my collaborators Nishant Malik and Feng Shi.
In our opinion formation with clustering reinforcement model, both network topology and state
of nodes change during the evolution of networks. The dynamic stops when there are no discordant
edges, and networks become static. We denote the stopping time of the dynamics to be tf , which
means the network reaches its final state. We also call the final state of the network a consensus
state, since there would be no discordant edge in this state. Note that l(tf ) = l00(tf ) + l11(tf ).
The consensus state of the network could be characterized by two diﬀerent consensuses: hegemonic
consensus and segregated consensus. To see these outcomes, we define a variable ⇢ to be the fraction
of nodes holding minority opinions in the consensus states; and also we define a variable s1 to be the
size of the largest connected component in the consensus state. In the hegemonic consensus state,
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there exists a dominant opinion in the network, ⇢ is close to 0, and s1 is close to 1. In this scenario,
a giant component with a size close to the whole network has nodes with the same opinion. On the
other hand, in the segregated consensus state, there is no dominant opinion in the network, ⇢ is close
to 0.5, and s1 is close to 0.5. In this scenario, a graph fission happens such that the final network
comprises two nearly equal-sized components, each having nodes with a single opinion. In Figure
2.3, we plot ⇢ and s1 with diﬀerent combinations of ↵ and  .
Furthermore, in Figure 2.3, we observe that there exists a sharp transition of ↵ for networks to
have a graph fission. Fixing the level of  , there is a critical value of ↵, or ↵c( ), which separates
the hegemonic and segregated consensus states. This critical value ↵c( ) suggests the importance of
  in this dynamic. When ↵ is large enough (↵ > 0.7), regardless of diﬀerent values of  , there is a
graph fission of the network. However, when ↵ is not large enough, as   increases, the critical value
of ↵c( ) decreases. This shows us the significance of the parameter   we introduce to the network
dynamic. To see a graph fission, the rewiring probability does not need to be large if there is a
strong tendency for an individual to rewire to his or her neighbors’ neighbor. Or put it another way,
if individuals have a high preference to cut the links of discordant neighbors and resort to a closer
neighbor to form small groups, then it will be hard for the network to have a dominant consensus
and a giant component in its final state.
2.4.2 Clustering Coeﬃcients
Results in this subsection were led and provided by my collaborators Nishant Malik and Feng Shi.
To show that this opinion formation with clustering reinforcement model could indeed increase
the clustering coeﬃcient in the networks, in Figure 2.4, we provide the evolution of the clustering
coeﬃcients with diﬀerent values of   with ↵ = 1. In this figure, circles are the highlight of the
clustering coeﬃcient in the consensus states. As we can see, if   = 0, the clustering coeﬃcient stays
at 0 as the network evolves. On the other hand, for a nonzero  , the clustering coeﬃcient grows
approximately linearly until the networks stop evolving. In Figure 2.4 (b), we plot the clustering
coeﬃcients of networks in their final consensus states at time tf with circles and provide an estimation
of the clustering coeﬃcients with the gray straight line. The higher the   is, the higher the final
clustering coeﬃcients would be. Using mean-field arguments we could acquire the final clustering
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Figure 2.3: (a) Levels of ⇢, the fraction of nodes holding minority opinions in the consensus states
with diﬀerent combinations of ↵ and  . In the hegemonic consensus state region, the minority
opinion fraction is close to 0. However, in the segregated consensus state region, the minority opinion
fraction is close to 0.5. Note that when   increases, the region of the hegemonic consensus shrinks.
(b) Levels of s1, the size of the largest connected component in the consensus state with diﬀerent
combinations of ↵ and  . In the hegemonic consensus state region, the largest connected component
in the consensus state is close to 1, the original size of the network. On the other hand, in the
segregated consensus state region, the largest connected component in the consensus state is close to
0.5, half of the original size of the network.
coeﬃcients in their consensus states, and we found that
C(tf ) =
3 
3hki   2 .
These two results match very well, and we can also see how   plays a role with the final clustering
coeﬃcient. We include the derivation of this estimated final clustering coeﬃcient in Appendix A.1.
2.4.3 Degree Distribution
Results in this subsection were led and provided by my collaborators Nishant Malik and Feng Shi.
We now want to study another fundamental measurement of complex networks: degree distribu-
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Figure 2.4: (a) Evolution of clustering coeﬃcients with diﬀerent values of   with ↵ = 1. Circles are
the clustering coeﬃcients in the consensus states. (b) The clustering coeﬃcients with diﬀerent values
of   with ↵ = 1 in the consensus states at time tf . Circles denote the simulation results, and the
line denotes the theoretical estimation.
tion. Degree distribution usually tells how connected a network is. In the opinion formation with
clustering reinforcement model, the interaction of the two mechanisms: voting and rewiring, would
together generate nontrivial outcomes of the final degree distribution in the consensus states.
In Figure 2.5, we plot the initial and final degree distributions in the consensus states with
diﬀerent values of ↵ and  . Note that as we mentioned before, we start the networks as an Erdős-
Rényi G(N, l) random graph model. Hence, with N large enough, we could approximate the initial
degree distribution of the networks by a Poisson distribution,
pk =
hkike hki
k!
.
Here we have the initial degree distribution highlighted by thick gray bands in each subfigure. When
↵ = 0, there is no rewiring happening in the dynamics. Nodes only change their opinions back and
forth, but the network structure does not change. Therefore, regardless of  , the degree distribution
remains the same.
The most interesting scenario must be the cases when ↵ is small (↵ = 0.2 and ↵ = 0.4). In these
two cases, the eﬀects of voting and rewiring are of the same magnitude. The voting mechanism
makes nodes nearby competing for their opinions with each other. On the other hand, the rewiring
mechanism makes nodes escaping from nodes with diﬀerent opinions. To put it another way, the
voting process promotes convergence to consensus states, but the rewiring process slows this down by
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encouraging graph fission. Since these two mechanisms have the same magnitude, it takes networks
longer time to reach their final consensus states. The network structures are shuﬄed so much for a
long time that the final degree distributions have more deviation from the initial ones. We can also
see the greater the   is, the larger the deviation is.
When ↵ gets greater, the rewiring mechanism starts dominating the network evolution. Nodes in
the networks quickly find the components they belong to or the components of nodes with the same
opinion by rewiring. This takes shorter time of networks to reach their consensus states. Although
↵ is greater, the actual rewiring event is not more than the previous case when ↵ is small. Hence,
the deviation of the degree distribution is also small in this case.
To study the impact of   on the final degree distributions, we perform a numerical analysis of
data in Figure 2.5 and obtain the following best fit of the distribution:
p(k) =
8>>>><>>>>:
hkik
k!
e hki, if ↵ = 0
b1
1.25hki(
k
1.25hki)
b1e
 ( k1.25hki )b1 , if ↵ 6= 0
Where the ↵ 6= 0 case is captured by Weibull distribution with b1 as the shape parameter and scale
parameter fixed constant equal to 1.25hki, and b1 is also a parameter depends on ↵ and  . This
parameter b1 encapsulates the variance in the degree distribution introduced by the interplay of the
voting mechanism and the preferential rewiring towards closing the triangles, that is, it contains the
information of both ↵ and  . The values of the parameter b1 are provided in Appendix A.2.
2.4.4 Qualitative Exploration
Results in this subsection were led and provided by my collaborators Nishant Malik and Feng Shi.
In Section 2.4.1, we discuss the sharp transition of ↵ for networks to have a graph fission without
appreciable change in the populations of voters. This critical value of ↵ depends on  . Moreover, we
have observed in Figure 2.3 that for ↵ > ↵c( ), the minority opinion fraction ⇢ is close to 0.5. On
the other hand, for ↵ < ↵c( ), the minority opinion fraction ⇢ trends to 0 with decreasing ↵. To
have a better understanding of the model, here we provide a holistic picture in Figure 2.6 and take a
closer look at the dynamics.
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Figure 2.5: Initial and final degree distributions in the consensus state with diﬀerent values of ↵ and
 . We start with Erdős-Rényi networks with mean degree hki = 4, which has a Poisson distribution,
highlighted by thick gray bands in each subfigure. We see a various level of deviation from the initial
degree distribution as ↵ and   change.
In Figure 2.6 (a), we plot the dynamics of the opinion formation with clustering reinforcement
model in the phase space of variables l01 and n1. Fixing the value of ↵, diﬀerent values of   are
labeled with diﬀerent colors in the figure. We start with half of the population with opinion 0 and
half of the population with opinion 1. At each time step, we pick a discordant edge l01 and update it.
We see in the cases when ↵ is large (↵ = 0.8 and ↵ = 1), l01 drops to 0 relatively quickly, the final
n1 is around 0.5, and the dynamics stop. When ↵ is smaller, diﬀerent arches appear, the dynamics
spend lots of time doing random walk on the arches, gradually reaches the l01 = 0 level, and the
dynamics stop. The smaller the ↵ is, the wider the arch span, as explored in detail (but restricted
to our   = 0 case) in [34]. We also see that in Figure 2.6 (b), fixing ↵ = 0.4, the greater the   is, the
narrower the arch. When   = 1, the arch breaks and this makes the minority opinion fraction ⇢
closed to 0.5, and it is consistent with our previous ↵c( ) argument.
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For ↵ < ↵c( ), the density of discordant edges at time t, or l01(t), can be approximated by
l01(t) = c1(1  n1(t))n1(t) + c2,
where n1(t) is the density of number of nodes having the opinion 1 and c1 and c2 are constants. We
drop the argument t for the sake of simplicity later. Solving the quadratic equation for l01, we get
n1± = 1/2± 1/2
p
1 + 4c2/c1. We denote n1+ to be the state when n1 is the majority opinion and
n1  to be the state when n1 is the minority opinion. The minority opinion fraction ⇢ here is the
smaller solution of these two, which is ⇢ = 1/2  1/2p1 + 4c2/c1. In Figure 2.6 (a-b) we show the
arches described by the quadratic equations above, as ↵ and   increase, these arches disappear for
↵ > ↵c( ). As we mentioned before, these arches behave like attracting manifolds for the dynamics,
in Figure 2.6 (b), we observe that as   increases, the arches are squeezed, i.e., the area enclosed
within the arches contracts.
We estimate c1 and c2 using the data generated from simulations (see Appendix A.3). For ↵ 6= 0
we found that ↵c( ) could be found by solving the equation
↵2.1 exp( 0.75 ) = 0.5.
To demonstrate the existence of this transition point in Figure 2.6 (c) we plot ⇢ for diﬀerent ↵ and
  vs. ↵2.1 exp( 0.75 ), we observe that for ↵2.1 exp( 0.75 ) > 0.5, ⇢ ' 0.5 (segregated consensus). For
  < 0.8 we observe that all the data for ⇢ fall onto the same universal curve.
2.4.5 Semi-analytical Approximation
Lastly, we compare the numerical simulation results with the semi-analytical approximation we
have. In Figure 2.7, fixing ↵ = 0.4, with diﬀerent values of  , the approximate master equation
(AME) estimation also gives us diﬀerent levels of arches as the simulation results suggest. We set
diﬀerent values of the stopping time t = 500, 1000, and 2000, and we see that the AME results stay
on the arches for a long time. In the opinion formation with clustering reinforcement model we
provide, eventually, the discordant edges l01 disappear. But it takes a long time for the simulation
results to reach this state. The simulations would do random walks on the arches, gradually go to
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Figure 2.6: (a) The dynamics of the clustering reinforcement model in the phase space of l01 and n1
with diﬀerent values of ↵ and  . Note that the dynamics forms arches when ↵ is small, and as ↵
increases, the size of the arch shrinks. When ↵ = 0.8 and ↵ = 1, there are no such arches formed.
Fix ↵ = 0.4, the dynamics of the model plotted as l01 versus n1. The width of the arches is squeezed
as we increase  , and when   = 1, the arch is destroyed. (c) Levels of ⇢, the fraction of nodes holing
minority opinions in the consensus states versus ↵. Here we transformed ↵ into ↵2.1 exp( 0.75 ). Note
that this transformation forces all the data for   < 0.8 collapses onto one universal line. Moreover,
there is a clear transition in when ↵2.1 exp( 0.75 ) = 0.5.
l01 = 0 and stop evolving. The arches are just temporary states of the network dynamic. Hence, the
diﬀerence of the AME and simulation results on the n1 axis, i.e., l01 = 0 level, would be the error of
our semi-analytical approximation. Note that the smaller the   is, the better the estimations one
can get from the AME method. This is because the AME method and, in particular, the model
terms in our equations for rates of rewiring to second nearest neighbors, assumes a network to be
locally tree-like, and when   is greater, the greater this assumption is violated. Therefore, AME
could give us a good qualitative estimation of the simulation results, and also good predictions of
the final fraction of opinions when   is not large.
In Figure 2.8, we compare the numerical simulations and the semi-analytical solution by Ap-
proximate Master Equation (AME) at ↵ = 0.4 with diﬀerent levels of   on a n1   l01 coordinate
system. The AME approximation gives us a good estimation of the qualitative behavior of the
simulations. As we discussed previously, the smaller the   is, more accurate result the AME method
could provide.
2.5 Conclusion
All social networks in the real world have one thing in common: high local clustering. This is a
nontrivial trait of social networks that few coevolving or adaptive network dynamics models deal with
directly. Its influence on a variety of contagion dynamics occurring on social or real-world networks
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Figure 2.7: Comparison between Approximate Master Equation (AME) and simulations for ↵ = 0.4.
Solutions for AME were sampled at t = 500, 1000, 2000.
has been studied in some detail, but systematic studies investigating its role in more realistic models
such as the ones with coevolving network component are still lacking.
Here, we provide an opinion formation model with simple clustering reinforcement. We introduce
a preferential attachment to an existing rewire-to-random opinion formation model. Under our new
model, there is a certain probability that if a rewiring happens, a node rewires to its neighbors’
neighbor, a triangle is closed, and the local clustering extent increases. We show that this new
mechanism we establish indeed fundamentally aﬀects the network dynamics, and leads to diﬀerent
qualitative and quantitative results.
We explore the parameter spaces and find out that there are mainly two types of consensus
could be reached in our model, namely the hegemony consensus and the segregated consensus. The
clustering coeﬃcient of networks indeed increases in our clustering reinforcement dynamics. By using
some mean field arguments, we give an estimation of the final clustering coeﬃcient of the networks.
We also investigate the final degree distribution and discuss how the parameters we introduce would
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Figure 2.8: Comparison between numerical simulations and the semi-analytical solution by Approxi-
mate Master Equation (AME) at ↵ = 0.4. Diﬀerent colors represents diﬀerent values of  , the color
scheme used here is the same as in Figure 2.4 and Figure 2.5 above.
impact it. Moreover, we provide a full investigation of the qualitative behavior of the network
dynamics; we see in some cases arches are formed, and how these related to the final fraction of
minority opinions. Furthermore, we also provide a semi-analytical framework based on approximate
master equation (AME) to study models with reinforcement of clustering. Using this estimation, we
could accurately predict the dynamical behaviors of the model for a variety of parameter settings.
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CHAPTER 3
SIS Model and Social Clustering on Complex Networks
3.1 Background Information
Mathematical modeling has provided significant insights into the processes involved in the spread
of epidemics [4, 81]. In recent years, the study of dynamical processes on complex networks has
caught much attention in this field [80, 112]. Loosely speaking, there are two types of dynamics that
are studied in the context of modeling epidemic spread on networks: in the first type, each node
is allowed to change its state with no evolution of the underlying network structure through time,
while in the second the temporal evolution of the network structure co-evolves or is adaptive with
the states of the nodes [58, 132]. Dynamics on coevolving networks may be more appropriate for
modeling epidemic spread, as people might avoid contact with individuals infected by a infectious
disease while readily building connections to healthy individuals. Such a preference in attachment
between individuals will not only lead to change in the social network but thus also influences the
spread of disease. Therefore, studying the interplay between dynamics and the adaptive coevolving
structure of networks has a potential to provide several critical insights into the processes involved
in the spread of epidemics.
Many real world networks are coevolving to some extent, and there are numerous studies on
coevolutionary networks in epidemic models, with several important analytical and computational
results [38, 58, 71, 132]. People studied fluctuations and the spread of disease as an SIS or SIR model
on large static or coevolving networks [48, 134, 157]. Many studies also focus on preventing infectious
diseases [21, 86, 150]. Moreover, network topology has a great impact on propagation dynamics
[73, 87, 107]. Recently, percolation or epidemic processes on networks with clustering have also been
studied broadly [51, 114]. More specifically, [103] shows that the clustering of networks could raise
the epidemic threshold and reduce the epidemic size from networks comparing to networks with the
same degree correlations but without clustering.
One of the critical components that has been missing in these studies is the influence of clustering
in coevolving networks on the resulting dynamics and network structure. Clustering is one of the
central properties of social networks, arising due to the ubiquitous tendency among individuals to
connect to friends of a friend, and can greatly impact a coevolving network system [96]. In this
paper, we generalize a model for coevolution of disease spreading on an adaptive network, in order
to investigate the role of local clustering. We also explore the additional complexity induced by
reinforcement of clustering with a new parameter which has preferential rewiring to close triangles.
The outline of the Chapter is as follows. In Section 2, we define our model and in Section 3, we
derive our semi-analytical method. In Section 4, we compare simulation results with the estimation
we obtained. We investigate the rewiring parameter space, study the change of degree distribution
and the evolution of clustering coeﬃcients. We also carry out a numerical bifurcation analysis.
Finally, in Section 5, we give our conclusions and some further remarks.
3.2 Model Description
Social networks are observed to have high clustering, because of the natural tendencies in social
ties for friends of friends being friends themselves. Therefore it is unrealistic to study dynamics
on social networks without taking clustering coeﬃcient into account. We also know that in real
world networks, especially in networks in epidemiology, network topologies are often coevolving with
the dynamics on them. The change of network topologies could be modeled through the process
of rewiring. If individuals catch an infectious disease, the infected ones may be quarantined or
avoided by healthy individuals, resulting in losses of their social ties. We here introduce an additional
component in this rewiring mechanism that reinforces the local clustering, i.e., a preference to rewire
to friends of a friend.
We employ a susceptible-infected-susceptible (SIS) model on a coevolving network [20, 59]. We
consider a network with constant numbers of nodes, N , and undirected links, M = hkiN/2, where
hki is the average degree in the network. At a given time, each node is either in a susceptible
(S) or infected (I) state. In every time step, infected individuals infect their susceptible neighbors
with probability  , while recovering from the disease with probability ↵. Meanwhile, susceptible
individuals break a link with an infected neighbor with probability   and—generalizing previously
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k , Z Z
Figure 3.1: Illustration of rewiring to neighbors’s neighbor. Before the rewiring, node X is of class
Sk,l (the left subfigure). Suppose a discordant edge Y Z is picked, with probability ⌘, Y would
actively dismiss its infected neighbor and rewire to its neighbors’s neighbor X. Then node X becomes
of class Sk+1,l (the right subfigure).
studied models—either rewire to a neighbors’ neighbor with probability ⌘, or rewire uniformly at
random to another susceptible node in the network with probability 1  ⌘. Importantly, rewiring to
a neighbors’ neighbor closes a triangle between three nodes, directly reinforcing network transitivity,
whereas rewiring uniformly at random can rapidly randomize any initial state of the network
structure.
Here we illustrate the eﬀect of rewiring to neighbor’s neighbor, with probability ⌘, in Figure 3.1.
3.3 Semi-analytical Methods
We study this generalized adaptive network model with a combination of simulations and
approximate analytic models. The frameworks of Pair Approximation (PA) and Approximate Master
Equations (AME) have both been used eﬀectively as analytical tools in similar settings [34, 52, 80].
PA is a method for moment closure where the density of triplets is given by an approximate equation
in terms of pairs, while AME can be used to achieve greater accuracy [52]. The AME framework
considers both the infection state and degree of nodes and the states of their immediate neighbors,
generating a system of diﬀerential equations to model the coevolution of the disease and network.
The AME method generally provides accurate approximation of the evolution of networks, and it is
still good around the critical point of the dynamics. Moreover, the AME method performs well in
both static and coevolving networks.
Inspired by this improved compartmental formalism or master equation method, [159] used an
approach (for studying adaptive SIS dynamics without any transitivity reinforcement) that treated
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the links as the objects and classify them according to the disease states, the number of neighbors,
and the number of infected neighbors of each node of its links. This link-based method could
generally improve the accuracy compared to the AME method. However, it also enormously increases
the computational cost from O(k2max) to O(k4max), where kmax is the maximum degree a node could
have in the network.
We use an approach similar to the one used in [97] to combine AME with PA, extending the
method to study the eﬀect of reinforcement of clustering. Let Skl(t) and Ikl(t) be the fraction of
susceptible and infected sites of total degree k which have l infected neighbors at time t. Following
the notation in [97], we also define the zeroth order moments of the Skl(t) and Ikl(t) distribution
by S ⌘ Pkl Skl and I ⌘ Pkl Ikl; the first order moments by SS ⌘ Pkl(k   l)Skl, SI ⌘ Pkl lSkl,
IS ⌘
P
kl(k   l)Ikl and II ⌘
P
kl lIkl; and the second order moments by SSI ⌘
P
kl(k   l)lSkl,
SII ⌘
P
kl l(l   1)Skl, etc.
It is worth noting that while the network states and topologies coevolve, there are diﬀerent
conserved quantities the system should obey. For example, since the networks are not losing
nodes, we always have S + I = 1, and this is the conservation of nodes. Similarly we always have
SS + SI + IS + II = hki, and this is the conservation of edges. The system should conserve all its
quantities at diﬀerent orders of moments.
Again, let Skl(t) and Ikl(t) be the fraction of susceptible and infected sites of total degree k
which have l infected neighbors. We have the following ODE governing the time evolution of the Skl
compartment:
dSkl
dt
= ↵Ikl    lSkl + ↵
⇥
(l + 1)Sk(l+1)   lSkl
⇤
+  
SSI
SS
⇥
(k   l + 1)Sk(l 1)   (k   l)Skl
⇤
+  
⇥
(l + 1)Sk(l+1)   lSkl
⇤
+  ⌘
 ⇥ l
k   1
IS
1
2II + IS
SI
S
+
k   l   1
k   1
1
2SS
1
2SS + SI
SI
S
⇤
S(k 1)l
  ⇥ l
k
IS
1
2II + IS
SI
S
+
k   l
k
1
2SS
1
2SS + SI
SI
S
⇤
Skl
 
+  (1  ⌘)SI
S
⇥
S(k 1)l   Skl
⇤
.
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Similarly the ODE governing the time evolution of the Ikl compartment is:
dIkl
dt
=  ↵Ikl +  lSkl + ↵
⇥
(l + 1)Ik(l+1)   lIkl
⇤
+  
 
1 +
SII
SI
 ⇥
(k   l + 1)Ik(l 1)   (k   l)Ikl
⇤
+  
⇥
(k   l + 1)I(k+1)l   (k   l)Ikl
⇤
.
To determine the initial condition, in each case, a fraction ✏ of nodes is initially infected at
random. This gives us
Skl(0) = (1  ✏)pk(0)
✓
k
l
◆
✏l(1  ✏)k l,
Ikl(0) = ✏pk(0)
✓
k
l
◆
✏l(1  ✏)k l,
and where pk(0) is the degree distribution at t = 0.
The diﬀerential equation system above contains 2(kmax + 1)2 diﬀerential equations. This level of
complexity provides a reasonable accuracy we need for the new reinforcing clustering model and we
do not need to deal with an O(k4max) system using the link-based formalism method. We use these
diﬀerential equations to estimate the evolution of networks and solve their solutions numerically,
arriving at a semi-analytical approximation of the network evolution.
3.4 Numerical Experimentation
We simulate networks with total number of nodes N = 25, 000, and total number of edges
M = 25, 000, and hence our mean degree is fixed to be hki = 2. To implement the simulations, as in
[97], we choose three diﬀerent initial degree distributions of the networks. The first distribution is
the Poisson distribution,
pPk =
hkike hki
k!
,
and we could use this to approximate the degree distribution of an Erdős-Rényi model with large N .
The second one is a truncated power law distribution,
pTPLk =
8><>:
1
C k
 ⌧ 0 < k 6 kc
0 k > kc,
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where we choose ⌧ = 2.161 and kc = 20 in order to make the mean degree hki = 2. The last one is a
degree regular distribution:
pDRk =  k,k0 ,
where   is the Kronecker  , hence every node would have the same degree k0.
We perform Monte Carlo simulations of the disease propagation on a network. In each simulation,
we use a Gillespie algorithm to accelerate the iteration process, and the step size here is a fixed
number 1/M . Self-loops and repeated links are not allowed in the simulation. Unless stated otherwise,
we will do 1,000 simulations for each set of parameters.
3.4.1 Exploration of the Parameter Space
Since the eﬀect of the parameter ⌘ depends on the rewiring parameter  , the first thing we want
to do is to explore the parameter space of   and ⌘. In order to compare with the original study in
[97], we fix the infection rate   = 0.04 and the recovery rate ↵ = 0.005, and we want to see how  
and ⌘ would aﬀect the disease prevalence I in the long run. The phase portrait of Figure 3.2 shows if
  is large, the susceptible nodes could easily get rid of the infected ones by breaking their links, and
all networks become disease free. When   = 0, there would be no rewiring process, network topology
does not change, and ⌘ would have no eﬀect on the network dynamics as well. More interesting
behavior happens when   is close but greater than zero, in this case ⌘ plays an important role for the
disease prevalence I, and this is the case we are interested in. Hence in the rest of the experiments
we will fix   = 0.04 and change the value of ⌘ to see how it influences the network dynamics.
3.4.2 Network Dynamics and the Eﬀect of ⌘
We plot the disease prevalence I against time t with diﬀerent ⌘’s in Figure 3.3. When ⌘ = 0 in
Figure 3.3 (a), our model would go back to the previous case in [97]. We see networks with diﬀerent
initial topologies will lead to diﬀerent results. In the Poisson and truncated power law cases, the
disease prevalence I is always positive, and people call these networks to be endemic. However, in
the degree regular case, the disease gradually disappears, and people call this situation disease free.
For an individual network, if the disease persists in it, the quantities of nodes being infected at
each time would fluctuate. That is, the disease prevalence I will vary within a band when time
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Figure 3.2: Phase plots in parameter space ( , ⌘) for the disease prevalence I on networks with
an initial (a) Poisson, (b) truncated power law, and (c) degree regular degree distribution. Other
parameters are   = 0.04, ↵ = 0.005 and ✏ = 0.1. We choose t = 10, 000, when most of the networks
reach their stationary states. The disease prevalence I is averaged over 30 simulations in all cases.
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Figure 3.3: Disease prevalence I against time t on networks with mean degree hki = 2 but with
diﬀerent initial degree distributions (pPk (Poisson): blue, p
TPL
k (truncated power law): magenta, and
pDRk (degree regular): red). Dots correspond to the mean computed over 1,000 simulations and lines
are the semi-analytical approximations. Parameters are   = 0.04,   = 0.04, ↵ = 0.005 and ✏ = 0.1 in
all cases. The ⌘ here are: (a) ⌘ = 0, (b) ⌘ = 0.2, (c) ⌘ = 0.4, (d) ⌘ = 0.6.
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t is large enough. However, this stochastic variation would be averaged out if we perform more
experiments and take the mean of their disease prevalence I. We declare a stationary state of the
process when the average disease prevalences of the ensemble of networks between two consecutive
steps diﬀer by at most 10 5, and we also define the stationary or final disease prevalence level to be
I1. Under this definition, networks with all three diﬀerent initial topologies reach their stationary
states before t = 5, 000 when ⌘ is not very large. Note that the disease prevalence I1 in stationary
state decreases with ⌘, indicating that ⌘ indeed aﬀects the network dynamics. When the networks are
still in their transient states, there are diﬀerence between simulations and our approximation, which
might be accounted for if we use link-based formalism method used in [159]. But most importantly,
our semi-analytical approximation captures the disease prevalence level of stationary states in all
four cases ⌘ = 0, 0.2, 0.4, and 0.6.
3.4.3 Degree Distribution
One nice thing about our semi-analytical approximation is this gives us information of degree
distribution of a network. AME uses (and keeps) degree information from nodes and their neighbors.
In Figure 3.4, we choose diﬀerent initial topologies with ⌘ = 0.4 and plot the degree distribution
in their stationary states with a log-log scale. Our semi-analytical approximation provides a good
estimation of the stationary degree distributions in each case. We then separate nodes into susceptible
(S) and infected (I) classes and our method still captures their stationary degree distributions very
well. Similarly, the Poisson and truncated power law cases show indistinguishable final degree
distributions.
To see how ⌘ aﬀects network degree distribution, we plot the initial and stationary degree
distribution of networks with diﬀerent ⌘ on a log-log scale in Figure 3.5. We separate the cases
of networks with three diﬀerent initial topologies, and plot their initial and stationary degree
distributions. Our semi-analytical approximation also gives us good predictions up to ⌘ = 0.8. We
see diﬀerent ⌘’s do not make much diﬀerence of each stationary degree distribution. Again, the
stationary degree distributions of Poisson and truncated power law cases become indistinguishable.
Moreover, for the truncated power law case, the heavy tail property is gone after the rewiring
processes that shuﬄe the network topologies.
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Figure 3.4: (a) Degree distribution and (b) degree distribution of S and I nodes on networks with
mean degree hki = 2 on log-log scale but with diﬀerent initial degree distributions (pPk (Poisson):
blue, pTPLk (truncated power law): magenta, and p
DR
k (degree regular): red). Dots correspond to
the mean computed over 200 simulations. Solid lines in (a) are the semi-analytical approximation of
total degree, dashed lines and dotted lines in (b) are the semi-analytical approximation of degree
distribution of S and I, respectively. Parameters are   = 0.04,   = 0.04,↵ = 0.005, ✏ = 0.1 and
⌘ = 0.4.
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Figure 3.5: Degree distribution with mean degree hki = 2 on log-log scale on networks with an
initial (a) Poisson, (b) truncated power law, and (c) degree regular degree distribution. We choose
⌘ = 0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, and 0.8. Other parameters chosen are   = 0.04,   = 0.04, ↵ = 0.005, and ✏ = 0.1.
We set t = 5, 000, all networks reach their stationary states at this time. Squares in each subplot are
the initial degree distributions. Dots correspond to the mean computed over 200 simulations. Lines
are the semi-analytical approximation of the stationary state degree distributions.
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3.4.4 Clustering Coeﬃcient
In order to make sure that our model really provides us nonzero clustering coeﬃcient and it
reinforces the clustering while rewiring, we study the clustering coeﬃcient against time. In Figure 3.6
(a), we explore ⌘ from 0 to 1, keep other parameters fixed and choose the initial degree distribution
to be Poisson. Like before, the case of ⌘ = 0 would go back to the previous case in [97], and we can
see the clustering coeﬃcient stays at C = 0 all the time. As time evolves, for networks with nonzero
⌘’s, the clustering coeﬃcients would rapidly increase and stop changing after these networks reach
their stationary states. However, in the case ⌘ = 1, networks again do not reach their stationary
states at time t = 5, 000, but we could still see the increasing pattern of the clustering coeﬃcient
against time. We also study this on the other two initial topologies. In Figure 3.6 (b), we see the
stationary clustering coeﬃcients increase as we increase ⌘. At time t = 5, 000, except the case ⌘ = 1,
all other networks reach their stationary states. As we showed before, networks with regular degree
distributions initially at this time would be disease free and they have higher clustering coeﬃcients
comparing to the other two cases. Moreover, the initially Poisson and truncated power law degree
distribution networks again show indistinguishable result of clustering coeﬃcient when ⌘ < 1. We
believe ⌘ = 1 is a special case in our model and we will study this case separately later.
3.4.5 Disease Prevalence
To study the whole picture of the parameter ⌘, again, we explore ⌘ from 0 to 1, keep other
parameters fixed and choose the initial degree distribution to be Poisson. We compare the simulation
results and the semi-analytical approximation in Figure 3.7. As we increase ⌘, the disease prevalence
at the stationary state gets lower and the error between simulation and approximation gets larger.
Although our approximation does not match the simulation result very well before they reach their
stationary state, this approximation still captures the disease prevalence level I1 when ⌘ is not very
large.
Unlike other cases are in their stationary states at the time t = 5, 000, in the case ⌘ = 1, we see
the disease prevalence I is still decaying gradually. Our semi-analytical approximation suggests that
I1 would go to 0 when ⌘ = 1, but it’s not clear what would be the disease prevalence level I1 of
the simulation. So we increase time to t = 107 when ⌘ = 1 as shown in Figure 3.7. As we can see
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Figure 3.6: (a) Clustering coeﬃcient C versus time t on networks with the same mean degree hki = 2
initial Poisson degree distributions. The parameters of the system are   = 0.04,   = 0.04,↵ = 0.005,
and ✏ = 0.1. Dots correspond to the mean computed over 30 simulations. Diﬀerent chosen values
of ⌘ are shown in the figure. (b) Clustering coeﬃcient C at t = 5, 000 versus ⌘ on networks with
the same mean degree hki = 2 but diﬀerent initial degree distributions (pPk (Poisson): blue, pTPLk
(truncated power law): magenta, and pDRk (degree regular): red). At time t = 5, 000, except the case
⌘ = 1, all other networks reach their stationary states.
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Figure 3.7: Disease prevalence I against time t on networks with the same mean degree hki = 2
initial Poisson degree distribution. The parameters of the system are   = 0.04,   = 0.04,↵ = 0.005,
and ✏ = 0.1. Dots correspond to the mean computed over 1,000 simulations and the lines are the
semi-analytical approximation. Diﬀerent chosen values of ⌘ are shown in the figure.
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Figure 3.8: Disease prevalence I against time t until t = 107 in the case ⌘ = 1 on networks with
mean degree hki = 2 initial Poisson degree distributions. (a) Dots are sampled every t = 1,000
correspond to the mean computed over 30 simulations. (b) The curve fitting on a log   log plot of
the data. We can see the data becomes a straight line and this suggests the data has a power law
decay.
in Figure 3.8 (a), the disease prevalence I reaches 0.12 at t = 107 but we are not sure whether it
will keep decreasing or not. If we plot I and t in the log-log scale, the simulation data becomes a
straight line. This suggests that the disease prevalence I has a power law decay. Using the curve
fitting software in MATLAB, the simulation result is well fitted by the curve I = 0.179t 0.173. Hence
although we do not know the disease prevalence level I1 when ⌘ = 1, we would say it is at most 0.12
and this will be our I1 we use later. Moreover, in our semi-analytical approximation, all the cases
except ⌘ = 1 have positive disease prevalence levels I1. Combining this fact and the very diﬀerent
time scale, we surmise that there is a phase transition happening when ⌘ = 1, which deserves further
investigation.
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We have shown that networks with diﬀerent initial topologies present diﬀerent behaviors. Using
the parameter set we chose before, networks starting with a degree regular degree distribution
would become disease free. On the other hand, networks starting with Poisson or truncated power
law degree distributions would be endemic. That is, in the degree regular case, networks have
I1 = 0, and in the other two cases we see networks with diﬀerent positive I1 depending on diﬀerent
⌘’s. In Figure 3.9 (a), we plot the I1 against ⌘ in Poisson and truncated power law cases, and
our semi-analytical approximation captures the I1 quite well when ⌘ is not close to 1. Moreover,
networks with these two diﬀerent initial topologies again show the indistinguishable I1 when ⌘ < 1
and ⌘ = 1 is a special case as in our previous discussion. In the degree regular case, since we know
networks will be disease free, we plot the time networks reach their stationary states as in Figure 3.9
(b) and we call this time tf . As ⌘ increases, tf increases. Large ⌘ would also create higher clustering
coeﬃcient as we saw before and this makes the time for networks to become disease free longer.
Although our semi-analytical approximation knows these network will become disease free, the tf
it predicts are not accurate. That means our approximation method is not very good when the
networks are still in transient states, and again, this might be improved if people use link-based
formalism method in the future.
3.4.6 Bifurcation Analysis
We plot two bifurcation diagrams of the systems in Figure 3.10 and Figure 3.11. in order to
explore the properties of the systems at equilibrium. As we mentioned before, it takes longer time
for the cases ⌘ = 1 to reach their stationary states so we plot these cases separately. In Figure 3.10,
the first row is the case ⌘ < 1 and the second row is the case ⌘ = 1. When ⌘ < 1, in all three cases of
initial topologies, there are small bistable regions around   = 0.16. The transition is discontinuous
when ⌘ = 0 as we show in the insets in the plots, and the gap between the transition starts shrinking
when we increase ⌘. When ⌘ = 0.8, the transition becomes continuous and this means ⌘ could make
a qualitative change of the dynamical system. In the case ⌘ = 1, the systems do not reach their
stationary states in the given time t = 10, 000 we set. However they still show continuous transitions,
which are very diﬀerent from the case ⌘ = 0. Last but not least, the critical value of   also decreases
in the case ⌘ = 1.
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Figure 3.9: (a) Disease prevalence I versus ⌘ at time t = 10, 000 on networks with the same mean
degree hki = 2 but diﬀerent initial degree distributions (pPk (Poisson): blue, pTPLk (truncated power
law): magenta, and pDRk (degree regular): red). (b) tf versus ⌘ on networks with the same mean
degree hki = 2 initial degree regular degree distribution. Dots correspond to the mean computed
over 30 simulations and the lines are the semi-analytical approximations.
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Figure 3.10: Bifurcation diagrams of the disease prevalence I versus ⌘ on networks with an initial
(a) and (d): Poisson, (b) and (e): truncated power law, and (c) and (f): degree regular degree
distribution. In (a), (b) and (c), we plot all the simulation results of 30 experiments. In (d), (e) and
(f), dots and the error bar are the mean and standard deviation over 30 Monte Carlo simulations.
The first row are the cases ⌘ < 1 and the second row are the cases ⌘ = 1. We vary the values of  
and ⌘. The other parameters of the system are   = 0.02, and ↵ = 0.005. We run simulations for
each value ✏ = 0.001, 0.01, 0.05, 0.99, and, 0.999. We set t = 10, 000, all networks with ⌘ not close to
1 reach their stationary states at this time.
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Finally, using the same parameter set as before, we study the eﬀect of ⌘ on bifurcation diagrams
on the three initially diﬀerent networks. Instead of fixing the initial infected fraction ✏ = 0.1, we
choose ✏ to be 0.001, 0.01, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 0.99, and, 0.999. We choose t = 10, 000 and at this time,
networks with ⌘ not close to 1 would reach their stationary states. In Figure 3.11, our semi-analytical
approximation gives us the same disease prevalence curves in the three cases. But in the degree
regular case, there is also a horizontal line I = 0 as in Figure 3.9 (a). In this case, if the initial
infected fraction ✏ is not large enough, networks would stay disease free. And if ✏ is larger, networks
would become endemic. On the other hand, in the truncated power law case, all networks with
diﬀerent ✏ would become endemic. The case in between is the Poisson case, when ✏ = 0.001, about
5% of the networks would become disease free. The stochasticity of simulations plays a role here.
In all networks with diﬀerent initial topologies, when ⌘ is closed to 1, we could see the simulations
spread more and this shows these networks are still in their transient states. If the networks are
endemic in their stationary states, our approximation gives us a good prediction of the disease
prevalence level I1. Moreover, in all these three cases, they share the same disease prevalence curve
even though they have diﬀerent stationary degree distributions as we showed in Figure 3.5. Our
conjecture here is given a set of parameters, when the networks reach their stationary states, the
disease prevalence level I1 would always fall on the same universal curve independent of the network
topologies, and that is the endemic state of the network. On the contrary, networks could go to
disease free if the initial infected fraction ✏ is not large enough. Like we showed in Figure 3.10, these
are the two stable regions or fixed points of the dynamics.
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we have introduced a model that includes reinforcement of clustering during the
rewiring process, hence providing a unique opportunity to study the role of clustering in altering the
dynamics of epidemic spread. In this new model clustering is controlled by combination of rewiring
parameter   and parameter ⌘. We also saw that the initial topologies of networks play important
roles on network dynamics.
We explored the parameter space of the rewiring parameters   and ⌘, identified the regimes ⌘
aﬀects network dynamics the most. By extending the AME method to its second and third layers
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Figure 3.11: Bifurcation diagrams of the disease prevalence I versus ⌘ on networks with an initial
(a) Poisson, (b) truncated power law, and (c) degree regular degree distribution. Lines are the
predictions of our semi-analytical approach and dots are the outcome of 30 Monte Carlo simulations.
We run simulations for each value ✏ = 0.001, 0.01, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 0.99, and, 0.999 and plot them
with diﬀerent colors. We set t = 10, 000, all networks with ⌘ not close to 1 reach their stationary
states at this time.
we were able to capture the dynamics on the networks when ⌘ is not very large. Our semi-analytical
approximation gives a good prediction of the disease prevalence when networks reach their stationary
states. In addition, this method also provides us a good estimation of network degree distribution as
well.
We carried out a bifurcation analysis in order to understand the properties of the systems at
equilibrium. We observed that introduction of the parameter ⌘ brought several quantitative changes
to the dynamics. We found there are bistable regions correspond to endemic and disease free states
of the systems. Moreover, there is a universal disease prevalence curve independent of network
topologies and our semi-analytical approximation could capture the disease prevalence accurately
when ⌘ is not close to 1.
A key assumption of our model is that the networks we investigate are locally tree-like. When ⌘
is large, this assumption will no longer be valid and our approximate master equation method was
not able to provide a good estimation. We showed that there exists an apparent phase transition at
⌘ = 1. We also observed that for ⌘ = 1, the time evolution of the system is slower than compared to
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any ⌘ < 1 case.
We provided a simple scheme that reinforces the clustering eﬀect on coevolving networks. Our
semi-analytical method takes the information of the status and degree of nodes, their neighbor nodes,
and their distance 2 or 3 neighbors. Using similar semi-analytical method, people could study more
complicated rewiring methods based on the degree of a node or arbitrary distance from a node.
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CHAPTER 4
Evolutionary Games on Complex Networks
4.1 Background Information
Game theory is the study of strategic decision making and the analysis of mathematical models
of conflict and cooperation between intelligent rational participants [49, 62, 108]. Game theory is
mainly used in biology, economics, political science, computer science, psychology, and even military
research. Classical game theory requires that all of the rational actors make their choices to optimize
their individual payoﬀs, that is, they make their strategic choices on a wholly rationally determined
evaluation of probable outcomes, or utility. Therefore, it is essential that in game theory each player
must consider the strategic analysis that the players’ opponents are making in determining their
own strategic choice.
Evolutionary game theory [65, 69, 119, 136, 155] is the application of game theory to evolving
populations of lifeforms in biology, and recently it has been expanded to various areas in social
science. Evolutionary game theory is useful in this context by defining a framework of contests,
strategies, behaviors, and analytics into which competition can be modeled. The key point in the
evolutionary game theory model is that the success of a strategy is not just determined by how
good the strategy is in itself, it is a question of how good the strategy is in the presence of other
alternative strategies, and of the frequency that other strategies are employed within a population.
How good the strategy is of course matters because in the biological world a successful strategy will
eventually dominate a population and competing individuals in it end up facing identical strategies
to their own.
One of the great diﬃculties of Darwinian theory, and one recognized by Darwin himself was the
problem of altruism [106]. The exploited cooperators are worse oﬀ than defectors. Hence according
to the basic principles of Darwinian selection, it would seem that the extinction of cooperation is
almost certain to happen. If the basis for selection is at the individual level, altruism is a hard to
interpret phenomenon. But universal selection at the group level, or, for the "greater good", fails to
pass the test of the assumption of individuals maximizing their own utility of game theory and is
certainly not found to be the general case in nature. In many social animals altruistic behaviors can
be found, and often altruism could be fundamental for species to survive [41].
The solution to this paradox can be demonstrated in the application of evolutionary game
theory to the prisoner’s dilemma game [7, 104], a game which tests the outcomes of cooperating
or in defecting from cooperation. Cooperation is usually analyzed in game theory by means of a
non-zero-sum game. The prisoner’s dilemma game is a standard example of a game analyzed in game
theory that shows why two completely rational individuals may not cooperate, even if it appears
that it is in their best interests to do so. It is certainly the most studied game in all of game theory.
As with all games in evolutionary game theory the analysis of prisoner’s dilemma is as an iterative
game [100]. This repetitive nature aﬀords competitors the possibility of retaliating or defecting based
on the results of previous rounds of the game. There is a multitude of strategies which have been
tested by the mathematics of evolutionary game theory and in computer simulations of contests [43]
and the conclusion is that the best competitive strategies are general cooperation with a reserved
retaliatory response if necessary. The most famous and perhaps one of the most successful of these
strategies is Tit for Tat which carries out this approach by executing a simple algorithm [7, 117].
In recent years, investigations have taken place on diﬀerent games played on random graphs and
social networks [1, 37, 45, 46, 64, 68, 77, 83, 89, 118, 124, 129]. For example, individuals could play
a prisoner’s dilemma game on a graph with various strategies and the option to switch partners,
hence, this game could be put into a framework of coevolving networks. On a coevolving or adaptive
network with a game, the vertices represent players and the edges denote the pairwise partnership,
or game interaction, between individuals.
The studies devoted to evolutionary games on complex networks are extensive. We can broadly
say that one of the most important goals of such studies is to find what kind of mechanism of
dynamics, diﬀerent game rules, or various network topologies can provide cooperation among selfish
and unrelated individuals.
The settings of spatial structure could enable cooperators to form small groups or clusters to
protect themselves against exploitation by defectors [118]. Studies have shown that the spatial
structure can promote cooperation [82], but there is also evidence that suggests the spatial structure
51
may not necessarily favor cooperation [64]. Many studies have elaborated on diﬀerent aspects of
cooperation on scale-free [54, 126], square lattice [123, 128], small world [84, 130, 141], social and
real-world networks [44, 72, 94], and multilayer networks [149].
In addition to network reciprocity inherent to games on complex networks, other notable rules
encouraging cooperative behavior are kin selection [61], group selection [33, 145], direct reciprocity
[122], indirect reciprocity [120, 121], social diversity [131, 156], voluntary participation [27, 63, 66],
and reputation [45]. All of these have been studied as interesting mechanisms that may promote
cooperation in evolutionary games.
In this Chapter, we focus our study on how players play a prisoner’s dilemma game with the
ability to change their strategies and switch partners if they are exploited by their neighbors. We
are interested in exploring the cooperative level among the individuals. By using the technique
of approximate master equations, we will provide a better approximation of the evolution of the
network structure and the individual status. We will compare the existing analytical methods and
the new approximation we developed, and provide qualitative and quantitative estimations of various
network properties. In Section 2, we introduce the model we investigate. We then describe the
improved approximation method in Section 3. In Section 4 we provide the numerical results and
comparison of the approximation methods. Lastly, in Section 5 and Section 6, we make concluding
remarks.
4.2 Model Description
We study the partner switching model in [46], on a coevolving network with a game, the vertices
represent players and the edges denote the pairwise partnership between individuals. We want to
study how players play a prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game with the ability to change strategies based
on the links they have and switch partners. We start with an Erdős-Rényi network with N nodes and
M edges. Each node has an equal probability to be a cooperator (C, denoted by two-dimensional
unit vector s = [1, 0]T ) or defector (D, s = [0, 1]T ) on one end of each link and engages in pairwise
interactions with his immediate neighbors defined by the partner network. That is, individual i
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plays a PD game with all his social partners and obtains an income as
Pi =
X
j2Ni
sTi Psj ,
where Ni represents the neighborhood set of i and the 2-by-2 payoﬀ matrix P is
C D0@ 1AC 1 0
D 1 + u u
where a single-parameter cost-to-benefit ratio u 2 (0, 1) is used to rescale the relative benefits of
outcomes in the payoﬀ matrix. That is, if the player i plays C and the player j plays C, then both
of them get the payoﬀ of 1; if the player i plays C and the player j plays D, then the player i gets
the payoﬀ of 0 and the player j gets the payoﬀ of 1 + u, and so on.
In each time step, we first randomly pick an edge that connects a pair of players with diﬀerent
strategies, i.e., a CD link denoted by Eij to update. Later on, we will extend the model to allow
all individuals to switch their defective partners, that is, both CC and DD links can be rewired.
With a given probability w, node i and node j connected by the edge Eij update their strategies;
otherwise, Eij is rewired (with probability 1  w). When one node updates its strategy, the node
has a probability   given by the Fermi function to change its state, as first proposed by [140], and
specified in detail below. When link Eij is rewired, the player with end state C unilaterally gets
rid of the partnership with its neighbor with end state D on the edge Eij . Suppose node i has the
end with state C, then it will randomly pick a player k from the remaining population as its new
partner. Figure 4.1 shows an illustration of the rewiring process.
When a strategy updating event occurs, node i and j consider play in the PD game with all
of their neighbors respectively, envisioning a total payoﬀ Pi and Pj as calculated above. Then the
strategy j replaces that of i on the edge Eij with likelihood given by the Fermi function
 (si  sj) = 1
1 + exp[↵(Pi   Pj)] ,
where ↵ represents the intensity of the selection [47, 144], or equivalently, its inverse 1/↵ could also
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Figure 4.1: Illustration of the rewiring process. Pick a discordant edge XY . Suppose node X is of
state C and node Y is of state D. Then with probability 1 w, the rewiring process happens. Node
X would dismiss its defective neighbor Y and rewire to a random node Z in the network, regardless
of the state of node Z.
represent the amplitude of noise [127, 148]. To be more specific, ↵! 0 leads to random drift while
↵!1 leads to deterministic imitation dynamics. Otherwise, the strategy of i replaces the strategy
of j on the edge Eij with likelihood  (sj  si) = 1   (sj  si). Figure 4.2 shows an illustration of
the rewiring process.
This partner switching evolution game model stops evolving when there are no discordant edges
remaining in the network. In the stationary state of the system, there are no CD edges, only CC
and DD edges exist. Hence, the final state creates a fission of these two (cooperative and defective)
groups of individuals. In Figure 4.3, we provide a visualization of the model shortly before fission
occurs.
4.3 Semi-analytical Methods
We study this generalized coevolving network model with a combination of simulations and
approximate analytic models. The frameworks of Mean Field theory (MF), Pair Approximation
(PA) and Approximate Master Equations (AME) have all been used eﬀectively as analytical tools in
similar settings. Among these approximations, AME can be used to achieve greater accuracy [53].
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Figure 4.2: Illustration of the strategy updating process. Pick a discordant edge XY . Suppose
node X is of state C and node Y is of state D. Then with probability w, the strategy updating
process happens. Node X and Y would compare their utility and the node with lower utility
would change its strategy with probability according to the Fermi functions. Suppose u = 0.5,
then node X has 1 unit of utility and node Y has 4 units of utility. By the Fermi function,
 (sX  sY ) = 11+exp[↵(PX PY )] = 11+exp[30(1 4)] ⇡ 1, that is node X has a probability close to 1 to
imitate node Y ’s state.
The PA estimation was obtained by [46], and here we provide the AME approximation.
The AME method is widely used in both static and coevolving networks. The diﬃculty of the
derivation of AME in this model is that usually the transition probabilities of states are constant or
depending on their neighbors’ states. For example, in the SIS model, the recovery rate is often a
constant µ while in the voter model, the probability for a node to change its state could rely on its
neighbors’ majority opinion. In the partner switching evolutionary game model, for a node to change
its state, at each time we need to compute its utility and compare with its neighbors’ utility, plug it
in the Fermi function, and obtain the transition probability. AME only contains the information of
the state of nodes, their degree and the state of their neighbors. Hence, we need some clever way to
estimate the utility of every node in the network and be able to compare them. We will explain how
we approximate these equations after we introduce the equations.
Let Ckl(t) and Dkl(t) be the fraction of cooperative and defective nodes of total degree k
which have l defecting neighbors at time t. We also define the zeroth order moments of the
Ckl(t) and Dkl(t) distribution by NC ⌘
P
kl Ckl and ND ⌘
P
klDkl; the first order moments by
NCC ⌘
P
kl(k   l)Ckl, NCD ⌘
P
kl lCkl + (k   l)Dkl and NDD ⌘
P
kl lDkl; and the second order
moments by NCCD ⌘
P
kl(k   l)lCkl, NCDD ⌘
P
kl l(l   1)Dkl, etc.
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Figure 4.3: Visualization of the partner switching model soon before fission occurs, for N = 1, 000
nodes, M = 5, 000 edges, cost-to-benefit ratio u = 0.5, strategy updating probability w = 0.1, and
initial fraction of defectors ⇢ = 0.5. Colors correspond to the two states of node; blue: cooperative
and red: defective.
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It is worth noting that while the network states and topologies coevolve, there are diﬀerent
quantities that must remain conserved by the system. For example, since the networks are not
gaining or losing nodes, we have conservation of nodes NC + ND = 1. Similarly we always have
conservation of edges NCC +NCD +NDD = hki.
The following pair approximation method was derived by Fu et al. [46],
dNC
dt
= w ·NCD · tanh

 
2
(⇡C   ⇡D)
 
dNCC
dt
= w ·
✓
NCD C!D   2NCDNCC
NC
 D!C +NCD
NCD
ND
 C!D
◆
+ (1  w) · NC
N
NCD
dNDD
dt
= w ·
✓
NCD D!C   2NCDNDD
ND
 C!D +NCD
NCD
NC
 D!C
◆
(4.1)
Again, let Ck,l(t) and Dk,l(t) be the fraction of cooperative and defective sites of total degree k
which have l defective neighbors. We have the following ODE governing the time evolution of the
Ck,l compartment:
dCk,l
dt
= w
⇢
 Dk,l(k   l)Dk,l    Ck,llCk,l
+  Ck,l+1 
C(l + 1)Ck,l+1    Ck,l C lCk,l
+  Ck,l 1 
C(k   l + 1)Ck,l 1    Ck,l C(k   l)Ck,l
 
+ (1  w)
⇢
NC
N
⇥
(l + 1)Ck,l+1   lCk,l
⇤
+
NCD
N
⇥
Ck 1,l   Ck,l
⇤ 
(4.2)
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Similarly the ODE governing the time evolution of the Dk,l compartment is:
dDk,l
dt
= w
⇢
   Dk,l(k   l)Dk,l +  Ck,llCk,l
+  Dk,l+1 
D(l + 1)Dk,l+1    Dk,l DlDk,l
+  Dk,l 1 
D(k   l + 1)Dk,l 1    Dk,l D(k   l)Dk,l
 
+ (1  w)
⇢⇥
(k   l + 1)Dk+1,l   (k   l)Dk,l
⇤
+
NCD
N
⇥
Dk 1,l  Dk,l
⇤ 
(4.3)
To see how the AMEs are derived, we will focus on explaining the Ck,l compartment, as the
derivation of the Dk,l compartment is similar. The first three lines of equation (4.2) with w are the
eﬀect of strategy updating and the last two lines with 1  w are the eﬀect of rewiring. To write the
AMEs, we need to keep track of all the quantities flowing in and out each time to our center class,
Ck,l. Refering to Figure 4.4, there are six flows related to the Ck,l compartment, and these are the
first six terms in the Ck,l equation. As we mentioned before, at each time step, one needs to know
the utility of the center and compare it with their neighbors’ utility. The first term is for a Dk,l class,
the center node with state D compares its utility with one of its C neighbors, changes its states to
C, and thus Dk,l becomes Ck,l, which is a positive change for the class Ck,l. And the second term is
for a Ck,l class, where the center node with state C compare its utility with one of its D neighbors,
changes its states to D, and thus Ck,l becomes Dk,l, which is a negative change for the class Ck,l.
Here we need to use the Fermi function   to find all the transition probabilities. Recall that the
payoﬀ matrix of a game is
C D0@ 1AC 1 0
D 1 + u u
where u 2 (0, 1). For a Dk,l class, the center node is of state D, it has k neighbors and l of them are
of state D. Hence we can compute the center’s utility as
PD = l · u+ (k   l) · (1 + u).
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Figure 4.4: Illustration of transitions to/from the Ck,l and Dk,l sets in the AME. For each set, only
parts of its neighbors are shown here, and the classes of sets are shown next to the corresponding
compartments.
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But, we do not have information about the neighbors of the center node’s C neighbors. We can only
approximate their utility by averaging the total payoﬀ across all C nodes. Therefore here we have
PC = 1 · 2NCC
NC
+ 0 · NCD
NC
.
Then we compare the center node D’s utility with one of its C neighbor’s utility by using the Fermi
function, and we denote this as:
 Dk,l(D  C) =
1
1 + exp[↵(PD   PC)] .
Likewise, for a Ck,l class, the center node is of state C, it has k neighbors and l of them are of state
D. We can compute the center’s utility as
PC = l · 0 + (k   l) · 1.
Then we estimate their D neighbors’ utility by
PD = (1 + u) · NCD
ND
+ u · 2NDD
ND
.
Lastly, we denote this transition probability as
 Ck,l(C  D) =
1
1 + exp[↵(PC   PD)] .
The third term to the sixth term in the Ck,l equation are the eﬀects of one of the neighbors
changing its state and leading to a change of the total quantity of Ck,l. We use   to denote rates of C
changing to D,   for rates of D changing to C, and superscripts to represent the state of the center
node. If the center is a C node and one of its neighbors changes its state from C to D, then we
denote this probability by  C . In similar fashion, if the center is a D node and one of its neighbors
changes its state from D to C, then we denote this probability by  D. To compute  C , we count
the number of CC edges in the network at each time, and then compute the number of edges which
switch from being CC to CD in the next time step. Here  C provides the expected number of D
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neighbors of a CC edge, that is, we define  C as
 C =
P
k,l(k   l)lCk,lP
k,l(k   l)Ck,l
.
Similarly we have
 D =
P
k,l l
2Ck,lP
k,l lCk,l
,
 C =
P
k,l(k   l)2Dk,lP
k,l(k   l)Dk,l
,
and
 D =
P
k,l l
2Dk,lP
k,l lDk,l
.
Following the six flows related to the Ck,l compartment, we obtain the first three lines of equation
(4.2), describing the strategy updating eﬀect in the Ck,l class.
The last two lines in the Ck,l equations are the rewiring eﬀect. The class Ck,l+1 would contribute
to the Ck,l if the center node C drops one of its defected neighbors and rewires randomly to a C
in the network. Similarly, the class Ck,l would decrease if for a Ck,l node, the center node C drops
one of its defected neighbors and rewires randomly to a C in the network. Lastly, a Ck 1,l would
contribute to Ck,l if the center receives a C node during rewiring and the class Ck,l would decrease
if a Ck,l center receives a C node during rewiring. The fourth line of equation (4.2) is an expression
corresponding to the center node actively rewiring to some other node in the network while the fifth
line describes the center node passively rewiring by the action of some other node in the network.
Figure 4.5 and Figure 4.6 illustrate this active and passive rewiring.
By following a similar fashion, we can obtain the equation of the Dk,l compartment as well.
The diﬀerential equation system above contains 2(kmax+1)2 coupled diﬀerential equations, where
kmax is the maximum degree a node can have in the network. Usually, kmax depends on network
structure and the mean degree. Here we choose kmax = 50. We use these diﬀerential equations to
estimate the evolution of networks and solve their solutions numerically, arriving at a semi-analytical
approximation of the network evolution. To solve these thousands of ODEs, we use the ode45 solver
in MATLAB until the solutions converge to a steady state.
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Figure 4.5: Illustration of active rewiring. Before the rewiring, node X is of class Ck,l. Suppose
one of X’s discordant edge is picked, and X actively dismisses its defective neighbor, rewiring to a
random node in the network. If node X rewires to a node of state C, then node X becomes of class
Ck+1,l. We recall that only C’s actively rewire in the present model.
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Figure 4.6: Illustration of passive rewiring. Before the rewiring, node X is of class Ck,l. Suppose in
the rewiring process, node X is passively rewired by a random node in the network. Then node X
becomes of class Ck+1,l. We recall that only C’s actively rewire in the present model.
62
4.4 Numerical Experimentation
We simulate networks with N = 1, 000 nodes and M = 5, 000 edges, and hence the mean degree
of the network is fixed to be hki = 10. We set the imitation parameter   in the Fermi function equal
to 30. We also introduce a parameter ⇢ to denote the initial fraction of defectors. First, we set
⇢ = 0.5, and we will explore the eﬀect of this parameter later. Initially, we start the networks to be
an Erdős-Rényi G(N,M) random graph model, that is, a network is chosen uniformly at random
from the collection of all graphs which have N nodes and M edges. Hence with large N , we could
approximate the initial degree distribution of the networks by a Poisson distribution,
pk =
hkike hki
k!
.
We perform Monte Carlo simulations of the evolution of the networks. In each time step, we
choose 100 edges and update them (as will be further explained below). In the case when only
discordant edges (i.e., CD edges) are updated, the dynamics will stop when there are no discordant
edges remaining or when the simulation reaches our selected stopping time t = 1, 000. Unless stated
otherwise, we do the Monte Carlo simulations 1,000 times for each experiment.
4.4.1 Exploration of the Parameter Space
In the stationary states of the network, either the dynamics would stop because of lacking
discordant edges or the change of quantities in each state is balanced. In our setting of dynamics
and parameter sets, every scenario we simulated reaches its stationary state before our stopping time
t = 1, 000. To see the eﬀect of u and w, first, we investigate the final fraction of cooperators in the
stationary states. For both u and w, we start from 0 and increase the step by 0.05 to 1, and we want
to explore the cooperative levels in the stationary states. In Figure 4.7, we have the heat map of this
result. When u is small, there is a high level of cooperators in the stationary states. And when w is
close to 0, there is a medium level of cooperators in the stationary states. Other than small u or w,
the networks would be full of defectors in the stationary states, which we will explore and explain
this phenomenon with our semi-analytical approximation together in Figure 4.8 and Figure 4.9.
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Figure 4.7: Simulation results of the final fraction of cooperators with diﬀerent combinations of u
and w. For both u and w axes, we pick the step to be 0.05 and plot the fraction of cooperators in
the stationary states in simulations. We take the mean of 50 simulations of each parameter set here.
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4.4.2 Final Level of Cooperation
Now we want to compare the simulation results and the two semi-analytical approximations. In
Figure 4.8, we consider w = 0, w = 0.05, w = 0.1, and w = 0.5, plotting the fraction of nodes in
state C in the stationary state of the networks against the cost-to-benefit ratio, u. There are three
sets of outcomes here: markers are the simulation results, dotted lines are the PA approximation,
and the dashed lines are the AME approximation. Although this figure only shows us the final
fraction of C’s, one also knows the final fraction of D’s simply because the sum of C and D ratios
should always be 1.
In the case w = 0, since there are no strategy updates happening in the networks, nodes couldn’t
change their states during the evolution. Hence, the final fraction of C and D will remain constant.
Since first we set ⇢ = 0.5, regardless of u we should get 50% of C and 50% of D in the stationary
states. In Figure 4.8, simulations, PA, and AME give us the same results, final ratio of C stays
constant of 0.5 with regard to u. Therefore, both the PA and AME approximations are satisfying.
When w > 0, the strategy updating starts playing a role. The greater the cost-to-benefit u is,
the stronger the incentive for nodes to defect. Hence, the final fraction of cooperators decreases as u
increases. In the cases w = 0.1 and w = 0.5, simulation results decrease slowly at first and suddenly
drop to zero around u = 0.2 and u = 0.6, respectively. This phenomenon is captured by AME
approximation not only by the qualitative behavior but also the critical dropping value of u. On
the other hand, although PA gives good qualitative estimation of the behavior, PA lines both drop
earlier and fail to provide a good prediction of critical points. Hence, comparing to PA, AME oﬀers
better predictions of the simulation. Lastly, in the case w = 0.05, the simulation results gradually
decrease when u increases. The gaps between simulation results and PA and AME gradually increase.
The PA curve drops to zero around u = 0.85, however, the AME curve does not have this qualitative
change. Therefore, throughout all the scenarios listed in this figure, AME always provides fitting
qualitative approximations of the simulation results, and it gives accurate predictions at the critical
points.
Similarly, we plot the final fraction in the stationary state of cooperators C versus w with diﬀerent
cost-to-benefit ratios, u in Figure 4.9. Here we consider four cases: u = 0, u = 0.01, u = 0.2, and
u = 0.8. All of them start from ⇢ = 0.5 when w = 0, because when w = 0 there is no strategy
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Figure 4.8: Fraction of cooperators versus cost-to-benefit ratio u with diﬀerent strategy updating
rates w in stationary states. Markers are the averages of 1,000 simulations results, dotted lines are
the semi-analytical results of pair approximation (PA), and the dashed lines are the semi-analytical
results of approximate master equations (AMEs). The PA results are diﬀerent from the ones shown
in [46], but we have confirmed the accuracy of our results in personal communication with the
authors of that paper.
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updating in the dynamics. Hence, all of the nodes only rewire but do not change their states. The
final fraction of C’s remains 50% in the networks. As w increases, the eﬀect of strategy updating in
the dynamics becomes stronger. In the cases u = 0 and u = 0.01, u is so small that there is almost
no incentive to defect, so in the strategy updating process C’s and D’s are almost indistinguishable.
However, because of the eﬀect of rewiring, C would drop its defective neighbor D, reducing the
number of partners for D. Comparing with C nodes, D nodes would not have as many neighbors and
hence would have less payoﬀ. This eﬀect makes more D’s change to C’s and leads to the dominance
of C’s when u is small. In the cases u = 0 and u = 0.01, both PA and AME provide accurate results
and behave well qualitatively.
When u = 0.8, as w increases, C nodes become more disadvantaged since the payoﬀ of defecting
is high. The final fraction of cooperators decreases to zero around w = 0.1, and both PA and AME
capture this critical value of w well. Although both approximations have humps when w is small,
they still give satisfying predictions and AME does not do worse than PA.
Finally, in the case u = 0.2, the incentive of defecting is not too large. The final fraction of
cooperators would increase at first due to the rewiring eﬀect, that is, C nodes gain more neighbors
and have higher payoﬀs when comparing the payoﬀs with D nodes. But when w gets greater, the
eﬀect of rewiring diminishes, C nodes would not have more neighbors rewiring to them and start
losing payoﬀ to their D neighbors. This eﬀect makes more C’s become D’s and the networks will be
dominated by defectors. Both of the semi-analytical approaches capture this qualitative change of
the dynamics. The fraction of final cooperators curve drop around w = 0.35, w = 0.2, and w = 0.4
for simulation, PA, and AME, respectively. Though not perfect, AME in this case still yields more
accurate prediction than PA. Hence, generally speaking, we can see that AME improves the results
PA could acquire in this figure.
4.4.3 Network Dynamics
Having explored the populations in the stationary states, now we explore how the networks
evolve. We are aware that there are two things happening to the networks: the states of the nodes
change and the structure of the networks also change. To see how the networks change with time, we
investigate the evolution of five fundamental quantities of the networks: the fractions of nodes/edges
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Figure 4.9: Fraction of cooperators versus w with diﬀerent cost-to-benefit ratio u values in stationary
states. Markers are the averages of 1,000 simulations results, dotted lines are the semi-analytical
results of pair approximation (PA), and the dashed lines are the semi-analytical results of approximate
master equations (AMEs).
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in states C, D, CC, CD, and DD. We compare the simulation results with the two semi-analytical
approximations we have. We choose a set of parameters u = 0.5 and w = 0.1, for which neither
of the approaches perform very well here. Since the time scale of PA and AME are fixed to the
equations, in order to keep our simulation results and semi-analytical results on the same time scale,
we carry out 100 updates at each unit time in the simulations. In this fashion, the three results
will enjoy the same time scale as we show in Figure 4.10. To perform the experiment, we do the 50
simulations and take the averages of them at each time step. In this figure, since the initial fraction
of defectors ⇢ is set to be 0.5, and we follow the Erdős-Rényi G(N,M) random graph model, both
C and D are 0.5, CC and DD are 0.25, and CD is 0.5. These are also the initial conditions of
PA and parts of the initial conditions of AME. One thing worth noting is that the total number of
nodes and edges are constant during the evolution, requiring both C +D and CC + CD +DD to
be equal to 1. The networks evolve with time until there are no discordant edges, i.e. when CD (the
black markers) equals 0. At a time slightly before t = 100, the networks stop evolving and all five
quantities keep constant after this stopping time. The PA method, in this case, stops evolving before
t = 10, and it gives the prediction that the networks are occupied by defectors and their links, which
is totally at odds with the simulations. On the other hand, the AME method stops evolving around
t = 160, when the black line goes to zero and the other four lines stay constant. Although the final
prediction of these five quantities is still oﬀ, the result is still better than PA. Not only does AME
gives the correct order of these quantities, but during the evolution, AME provides qualitatively
correct trajectories of how these quantities change with time. For example, the quantity of D first
goes up and then goes down below the quantity of C. AME captures this phenomenon. There is a
hump at the beginning of the red line and it goes down gradually below the blue line. The other
AME curves have similar qualitatively correct trajectories. Hence compared to PA, even if AME
does not give us an accurate prediction in this specific parameter set, this still works much better
than PA.
In Figure 4.11, we compare the simulation results with AME approximation. Since we know AME
does no worse than PA in all of our observed cases, we only compare AME and simulation results.
We choose four diﬀerent parameter sets here: u = 0.2, w = 0.1; u = 0.2, w = 0.3; u = 0.5, w = 0.1;
and u = 0.5, w = 0.3. In each case, AME provides the correct order of C (blue), D (red), CC
(green), CD (magenta), and DD (black) ratios in the stationary states. In cases like u = 0.2, w = 0.1;
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Figure 4.10: Evolution of five fundamental quantities versus time t when u = 0.5 and w = 0.1.
We plot C (blue), D (red), CC (green), CD (magenta), and DD (black) ratios and compare these
with two semi-analytical approximations. Markers are the averages of 50 simulations results, dotted
lines are the semi-analytical results of pair approximation (PA), and the dashed lines are the semi-
analytical results of approximate master equations (AMEs). PA dynamics stop around t = 10, and
it gives bad estimations. On the other hand, AME provides better estimations of the simulation
results.
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Figure 4.11: Evolution of five fundamental quantities versus time t in diﬀerent parameter sets, upper
left: u = 0.2, w = 0.1, upper right: u = 0.2, w = 0.3, lower left: u = 0.5, w = 0.1, and lower right:
u = 0.5, w = 0.3. We plot C (blue), D (red), CC (green), CD (magenta), DD (black) ratios and
compare these with our semi-analytical approximations. Markers are the averages of 50 simulations
results and the lines are the semi-analytical results of approximate master equations (AMEs). AME
provides qualitatively good estimations of the simulation results.
u = 0.2, w = 0.3; and u = 0.5, w = 0.3, AME method gives fairly accurate prediction of the final
levels of these quantities. Moreover, throughout the evolution, AME generates similar qualitatively
correct curves as the simulation results. Hence not only do we have a better idea of the final level of
these important quantities, we can also get qualitatively good evolution trajectories by plotting the
AME trajectories while solving these equations.
4.4.4 Degree Distribution
As we discussed before, the AME method takes in more information and has higher computational
cost, but it can generally provide better approximation than PA. There are also things that AME
could predict but PA could not, such as degree distributions. Since AME needs the information of
the states of nodes, the states of nodes’ neighbors, and the degree of nodes, this method can also
give us this information during the network evolution. Therefore by examining the variables of in
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the AME method, we can have knowledge of the degree distributions of the networks at any given
time. We simply cannot get the same information from PA. Here in Figure 4.12, we plot the degree
distribution of C and D nodes separately in the stationary states and compare the simulation results
and AME approximation. In each case, since we initialize with random strategies on the Erdős-Rényi
G(N,M) random graph model, the initial degree distributions are approximately Poisson when the
network size N is large enough. To see the degree distributions in the stationary states, we choose the
same parameter sets as in the previous figure: u = 0.2, w = 0.1; u = 0.2, w = 0.3; u = 0.5, w = 0.1;
and u = 0.5, w = 0.3. In the case u = 0.5, w = 0.3, the AME method yields very accurate prediction
of C, D, CC, CD, and DD levels as we showed before. Not surprisingly, AME also gives us a superb
prediction of the final degree distribution. In the stationary state of this case, D nodes dominate
the whole network, and there is no C node left. The AME method successfully provides us the
degree distribution of C and D nodes respectively. In the other three cases, although the AME
predictions are not that accurate, we can still see it gives us a hint of how the degree distribution
behaves. Hence, we know generally speaking, if the AME gives us good predictions of the dynamics,
it will also give us a nice prediction of its degree distribution. And this is a result PA method can
not provide.
4.4.5 Exploration of the Initial Fraction of Defectors, ⇢
Finally, we explore the eﬀect of the initial fraction of defectors parameter ⇢ in Figure 4.13 and
Figure 4.14. In these two figures, we fix the parameter to be w = 0.1 in Figure 4.13 and u = 0.2 in
Figure 4.14, and we change the other parameter u, and w, respectively, to see the final fraction of
cooperators against ⇢ in stationary states. And we compare the simulation results (markers) with
our AME approximation (lines). It is worth noting that in both figures, all the trajectories generated
by simulation and approximation results would pass through the upper left and the lower right
corners. This is because when ⇢ = 0, there are no D nodes in the networks, there is no discordant
edge, and the networks would not evolve. The final fraction of cooperators remains 100%. The final
fraction of cooperators is 0% for the similar reason in the case ⇢ = 1. In Figure 4.13, for all u curves,
the final fraction of cooperators would first gradually decrease and drop to zero suddenly at diﬀerent
values of ⇢, and AME method captures this qualitative behavior in diﬀerent levels of u. Moreover,
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Figure 4.12: Degree distribution in the stationary states in diﬀerent parameter sets, upper left:
u = 0.2, w = 0.1, upper right: u = 0.2, w = 0.3, lower left: u = 0.5, w = 0.1, and lower right:
u = 0.5, w = 0.3. Bars are the averages of 50 simulations results and the lines are the semi-analytical
results of approximate master equations (AMEs). AME provides qualitatively good estimations of
the simulation results. Blue bars and lines are degrees of cooperative nodes, and red bars and lines
are degrees of defective nodes.
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Figure 4.13: Fraction of cooperators versus ⇢ with w = 0.1 in stationary states. Diﬀerent cost-to-
benefit ratio u: 0, 0.1, ..., 1 are chosen. Markers are the averages of 50 simulations results and the
dashed lines are the semi-analytical results of approximate master equations (AMEs).
fixing w = 0.1, smaller u would result in higher cooperative level, since the incentive of defecting is
less when u is small. We also find out that AME is more accurate when u is small in this figure.
In Figure 4.14, fixing u = 0.2, the diagonal line is the case w = 0, there are no strategy updates
happening, hence the cooperative level remains the same during the evolution. The w curves drop to
zero more quickly when ⇢ increases, that means the strategy updating eﬀect is more sensitive to the
initial fraction of defectors ⇢. When w is large, the networks count more on the strategy updating
dynamics, and the stationary cooperative level would drop to zero more quickly. As we show in this
figure, the AME curves suddenly drop to zero when w > 0.4. Although not very accurate, AME
method still gives us qualitatively correct predictions of these scenarios.
4.5 Discussion
We are interested in how to increase the final level of cooperation, that is, the final ratio of
cooperators, and how to maximize the overall utility in the network. The first question could
be answered by Figure 4.7, where we investigate the final fraction of cooperators with diﬀerent
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Figure 4.14: Simulation results of the final fraction of CC links with diﬀerent combinations of u and
w. For both u and w axes, we pick the step to be 0.05 and plot the fraction of cooperators in the
stationary states in simulations. We take the mean of 50 simulations of each parameter set here.
combinations of u and w. To increase the final fraction of cooperators, the most eﬀective way is to
reduce the cost-to-benefit ratio, u in the model. Then nodes do not have much incentive to defect
and this would increase the final cooperative level greatly, in many cases getting close to 1. Or one
could also make the parameter w small. In this case, nodes do not have much chance to update
their strategy; they do a lot of rewiring and the dynamics will stop when there are no discordant
edges. However, this would only make the final cooperative level close to 0.5, the initial cooperative
level. Furthermore, one can decrease the initial fraction of defectors parameter ⇢. As we studied in
Figure 4.13 and Figure 4.14, the smaller the ⇢ is, the greater of final cooperative level.
The second question, how to maximize the total utility or payoﬀ is slightly diﬀerent. In the
partner switching evolutionary game model we study here, no matter how the structure of networks
and the state of the nodes change, the total number of nodes and edges are fixed. Utility comes from
every edge in the network. According to the model, the total utility of a CC edge is 2, the total
utility of a CD edge is 1 + u, and the total utility of a DD edge is 2u, where u 2 (0, 1). Hence, the
average utility of a CC edge is greater than CD and than DD. And this is a trait of a prisoner’s
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dilemma game. If we want to maximize the overall utility, we need to have more CC links. We not
only wish to increase the fraction of C’s, but we also need to make sure the links mostly belong to
CC, not DD. As we will discuss next chapter, if we also let DD rewire, we can increase the overall
utility even more.
We plot the final fraction of CC edges with diﬀerent combinations of u and w in Figure 4.15. It
generally shows the same pattern as in Figure 4.6, but when w is close to 0, the CC level increases to
around 0.75. This is because when there is no strategy updating, nodes can not change their states,
and the only thing for the nodes to do is to rewire until there is no discordant edge. If w = 0, then
the network would stop evolving until all the C’s in the CD edges dismiss their defective neighbors
and rewire to the C nodes. Since no nodes could change their states, the final CC ratio would equal
to 1 minus the initial DD ratio, that is 1 - 0.25 = 0.75.
We used PA and AME approaches to approximate the simulation results here. It is also worth
noticing that [159] used an approach for studying adaptive SIS networks that treated the links as the
objects and classifies them according to the disease states, the number of neighbors, and the number
of infected neighbors of each node of its links. This link-based method could generally improve the
accuracy compared to the AME method. However, it also enormously increases the computational
cost from O(k2max) to O(k4max), where kmax is the maximum degree a node could have in the network.
4.6 Conclusion
Investigations have taken place on diﬀerent evolutionary games played on random graphs and
social networks. Individuals could play a prisoner’s dilemma game on graphs with various strategies
and the option to switch partners. Therefore, this game could be put into a framework of coevolving
networks. We follow the node-based dynamics, which means each node can use only one strategy
(cooperate or defect) towards all of his or her neighbors. We explore the overall parameter space
and see the combination eﬀect of the parameter related to partner switching and strategy updating.
Also in our work, we improve the existing pair approximation (PA) by using approximate master
equations (AMEs), and get more accurate approximations of the dynamics in the stationary states.
We investigate the evolution of the dynamics and see how the AMEs could approximate this. We
also use the AME method to estimate the degree distributions of diﬀerent parameter sets in their
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Figure 4.15: Simulation results of the final fraction of CC links with diﬀerent combinations of u and
w. For both u and w axes, we pick the step to be 0.05 and plot the fraction of cooperators in the
stationary states in simulations. We take the mean of 50 simulations of each parameter set here.
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stationary states, which PA is not able to predict. Furthermore, we explore the parameter ⇢, the
initial fraction of defectors, and see how it aﬀects the final cooperative level.
Following the existing partner switching model, we holistically explore the eﬀects of its parameters.
We discuss how to increase the final cooperative level and improve the existing method to approximate
the network dynamics. In the next chapter, we extend the current model and see how the networks
behave if we change the network dynamics. We hope that our results provide insight into the
understanding of the evolution of the games playing on coevolving networks.
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CHAPTER 5
Evolutionary Games on Complex Networks – A Variation Model
5.1 Model Description
In this Chapter, we will study a slightly diﬀerent dynamics of the partner switching evolution
game model in the previous Chapter. We want to investigate the network evolution when we also let
DD edges rewire, and we want to investigate how this dynamic aﬀects the final cooperation level.
Following the previous Chapter, on a coevolving network with a game, the vertices represent
players and the edges denote the pairwise partnership between individuals. We want to study how
players play a prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game with the ability to change strategies on each individual
links they have and switch partners. We start with an Erdős-Rényi network with N nodes and M
edges.
The strategy updating part is the same as in the previous Chapter. The only diﬀerent thing is
now we not only let CD edges but also DD edges to rewire. In each time step, we first randomly
pick a CD or DD edge. If a CD edge is picked, then with probability w, the strategy updating
process happens, and with probability 1   w, the player with state C unilaterally gets rid of the
partnership with its neighbor with state D and rewires to an arbitrary node in the network. On the
other hand, if a DD edge is picked, then with probability w nothing happens, and with probability
1   w one end chosen randomly dismisses the other end and rewires to an arbitrary node in the
network. Hence during the whole process, the total amount of nodes and edges remain constant.
This variation partner switching evolution game model stops evolving when there are no CD
and DD edges in the system, or it also stops when there is only one state in the network. To put
it another way, there would be two cases in the stationary state of the network. Case 1: C and D
nodes coexist in the network, but there are no CD or DD edges. Case 2: There is only one state of
nodes (either C or D) in the network. In both cases, there is no possibility for a node to change its
state and hence, we stop the dynamics.
In Figure 5.1, we provide a visualization of the model in the stationary state (case 1). We choose
cost-to-benefit ratio u = 0.5, strategy updating probability w = 0.1, and initial fraction of defectors
⇢ = 0.5. In this case, C and D coexist in the network, but there are no CD or DD edges. The C
nodes own all the edges and they form a single component to defend the exploitation of D. Moreover,
note that all the D nodes in this case are isolated nodes.
On the other hand, in Figure 5.2, we have another visualization of the model in the stationary
state (case 2). We choose cost-to-benefit ratio u = 1, strategy updating probability w = 0.5, and
initial fraction of defectors ⇢ = 0.5. In this case, only D nodes exist in the network, and all the
edges are DD edge. The dynamics stops because of lacking of C nodes for D nodes to update their
strategies. In contrast to many isolated nodes we see in the previous case, this final network forms a
giant component instead.
5.2 Semi-analytical Methods
We study the second version of the partner switching models on coevolving networks with a
combination of simulations and approximate analytic models. Likewise, we also compare the pair
approximation (PA) and the approximate master equation (AME) approach with the simulation
results.
Following the notation of the previous Chapter, here we derive the PA equations for this variation
partner switching evolution game model.
dNC
dt
=w ·NCD · tanh

 
2
(⇡C   ⇡D)
 
dNCC
dt
=w ·
✓
NCD C!D   2NCDNCC
NC
 D!C +NCD
NCD
ND
 C!D
◆
+ (1  w) · NC
N
NCD
dNDD
dt
=w ·
✓
NCD D!C   2NCDNDD
ND
 C!D +NCD
NCD
NC
 D!C
◆
  (1  w) · NC
N
NDD
Suppose now both CD and DD could break their links. We also have the following ODE governing
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Figure 5.1: Visualization of the second partner switching model in the stationary state, for N = 1, 000
nodes, M = 5, 000 edges, cost-to-benefit ratio u = 0.5, strategy updating probability w = 0.1, and
initial fraction of defectors ⇢ = 0.5. Colors correspond to the two states of node; blue: cooperative
and red: defective. In this case, C nodes and D nodes coexist in the network, but there are no CD
or DD edges.
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Figure 5.2: Visualization of the second partner switching model in the stationary state, for N = 1, 000
nodes, M = 5, 000 edges, cost-to-benefit ratio u = 1, strategy updating probability w = 0.5, and
initial fraction of defectors ⇢ = 0.5. Colors correspond to the two states of node; blue: cooperative
and red: defective. In this case, only D nodes exist in the network, and all the edges are DD edges.
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the time evolution of the Ck,l compartment:
dCk,l
dt
= w
⇢
 Dk,l(k   l)Dk,l    Ck,llCk,l
+  Ck,l+1 
S(l + 1)Ck,l+1    Ck,l SlCk,l
+  Ck,l 1 
S(k   l + 1)Ck,l 1    Ck,l S(k   l)Ck,l
 
+ (1  w)
⇢
NC
N
⇥
(l + 1)Ck,l+1   lCk,l
⇤
+
NCD
N
⇥
Ck 1,l   Ck,l
⇤
+
NDD
N
⇥
Ck 1,l 1   Ck,l
⇤ 
Similarly the ODE governing the time evolution of the Dk,l compartment is:
dDk,l
dt
= w
⇢
   Dk,l(k   l)Dk,l +  Ck,llCk,l
+  Dk,l+1 
I(l + 1)Dk,l+1    Dk,l I lDk,l
+  Dk,l 1 
I(k   l + 1)Dk,l 1    Dk,l I(k   l)Dk,l
 
+ (1  w)
⇢⇥
(k   l + 1)Dk+1,l   (k   l)Dk,l
⇤
+
NC
N
⇥
(l + 1)Dk,l+1   lDk,l
⇤
+
⇥
(l + 1)Dk+1,l+1   lDk,l
⇤
+
NCD
N
⇥
Dk 1,l  Dk,l
⇤
+
NDD
N
⇥
Dk 1,l 1  Dk,l
⇤ 
The diﬀerential equation system above contains 2(kmax + 1)2 diﬀerential equations, where
kmax is the maximum degree a node can have in the network. Usually, kmax depends on network
structure and the mean degree. Here we choose kmax = 50. We use these diﬀerential equations to
estimate the evolution of networks and solve their solutions numerically, arriving at a semi-analytical
approximation of the network evolution. To solve these thousands of ODEs, we use the ode45 solver
in MATLAB when all the solutions converge.
5.3 Numerical Experimentation
As in the previous Chapter, we simulate networks with N = 1, 000 nodes, M = 5, 000 edges, and
hence the mean degree of the network is fixed to be hki = 10. We set the imitation parameter ↵ in
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the Fermi function equal to 30. As before, we introduce a parameter ⇢ to denote the initial fraction
of defectors. First, we set ⇢ = 0.5 and we will explore the eﬀect of this parameter later. Initially, we
start the networks to be an Erdős-Rényi G(N,M) random graph model, that is, a network is chosen
uniformly at random from the collection of all graphs which have N nodes and M edges. Hence
with large N , we could approximate the initial degree distribution of the networks by the Poisson
distribution,
pk =
zke z
k!
.
We perform Monte Carlo simulations of the evolution of the networks. In each time step, we
choose 100 edges and update them with the same reason provided in the previous Chapter, that
is, to match the time scale of numerical simulations and the semi-analytical approximations. The
dynamics will stop when there are no CD or DD edges, only one state of nodes in the network, or
when it reaches our stopping time t = 1, 000.
5.3.1 Exploration of the Parameter Space
To see the eﬀect of cost-to-benefit ratio u and strategy updating probability w, first, we investigate
the final fraction of cooperators and fraction of CC links in the stationary states. For both u and w,
we start from 0 and increase the step by 0.05 to 1, and we want to explore the cooperative levels in
the stationary states. In Figure 5.3 and Figure 5.4, we have the heat map of this result. There are
not many diﬀerences with the heat map we got in the previous Chapter. When u is small, there is a
high level of cooperators in the stationary states. And when w is close to 0, there is a medium level
of cooperators in the final states. Most importantly, when w is small and u is large, the cooperative
level is higher than the first model in Chapter 4. We see that letting DD to be able to rewire can
increase the cooperation level when w is small. Other than small u or w, the networks are full of
defectors in the stationary states, which we will explore and explain this phenomenon with our
semi-analytical approximations together in Figure 5.5 and Figure 5.6.
Note that in the stationary state of this second model, there would only be CC links if C and
D nodes coexist in the network; or in the other case, if there is no C node, only DD links would
exist. There exist two clear regions in the parameter space where C or D nodes dominate, and on
the boundary, that is the place where stochasticity of the dynamics happens. Sometimes C nodes
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Figure 5.3: Simulation results of the final fraction of cooperators with diﬀerent combinations of
cost-to-benefit ratio u and strategy updating probability w. For both u and w axes, we pick the
step to be 0.05 and plot the fraction of cooperators in the stationary states in simulations. We take
the mean of 50 simulations of each parameter set here.
dominate and sometimes D nodes dominate so that we could see diﬀerent colors on the boundaries
of Figure 5.3 and Figure 5.4.
5.3.2 Final Level of Cooperation
Now we want to compare the simulation results and the two semi-analytical approximations. In
Figure 5.5, fix w = 0, w = 0.05, w = 0.1, and w = 0.5, we plot the ratio of C’s in the stationary
state of the networks against the cost-of-benefit ratio, u. There are three sets of outcomes here:
markers are the simulation results, dotted lines are the PA approximation, and the dash lines are
the AME approximation. Although this figure only shows us the final fraction of C’s, one could also
know the final fraction of D’s simply because the sum of C and D ratios should always be 1.
In the case w = 0, since there are no strategy updates happening in the networks, nodes couldn’t
change their states during the evolution. Hence, the final fraction of C and D will remain constant.
Since first we set ⇢ = 0.5, regardless of u we should get 50% of C and 50% of D in the stationary
states. In Figure 5.4, simulations, PA, and AME give us the same results, where the final ratio of C
stays constant of 0.5 with regard to u. Therefore, both the PA and the AME approximations here are
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Figure 5.4: Simulation results of the final fraction of CC links with diﬀerent combinations of cost-to-
benefit ratio u and strategy updating probability w. For both u and w axes, we pick the step to be
0.05 and plot the fraction of cooperators in the stationary states in simulations. We take the mean
of 50 simulations of each parameter set here.
accurate. When w > 0, the strategy updating starts playing a role. The greater the cost-of-benefit u
is, the more incentive for nodes to defect. Hence, the final fraction of cooperators decreases as u
increases.
In the cases w = 0.1 and w = 0.5, both simulation results decrease slowly at first and drop
faster to zero around u = 0.2 and u = 0.6, respectively. This phenomenon is captured by the AME
approximation not only by the qualitative behavior but also the critical dropping value of u. On
the other hand, although PA could give us a good qualitative estimation of the behavior, PA lines
both drop earlier and fail to provide a good prediction of critical points. Hence comparing to PA,
the AME method oﬀers better predictions of the simulation. Lastly, in the last case w = 0.05, the
simulation results gradually decrease when u increase. The gaps between simulation results and PA
and AME gradually increase. PA curve drops to zero around u = 0.9, however, the AME curve
does not have this qualitative change. Therefore, throughout all the scenarios listed in this figure,
PA does no better prediction than the AME method. The AME method always provides satisfying
qualitative approximation of the simulation results, and it gives accurate predictions at the critical
points.
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Figure 5.5: Fraction of cooperators versus cost-to-benefit ratio u with diﬀerent strategy updating
probability w values in stationary states. Markers are the averages of 1,000 simulations results,
dotted lines are the semi-analytical results of pair approximation (PA), and the dashed lines are the
semi-analytical results of approximate master equations (AMEs).
Comparing Figure 5.5 with Figure 4.8, the diﬀerence between these two models is that if DD
edges are also allowed to rewire, when in the case when w is small but not zero, the final fraction of
C nodes is higher. In the case when w = 0.05 and w = 0.1, in these two cases the two trajectories
start at the same high when u = 0, and the C ratio in the second model is always no less than the
first model as u increases. This is because when we allow DD to rewire, D nodes become more
unfavorable. In the first model, if a DD link is formed, then it is fixed unless the state of either
node changes. This eﬀect provides less chance for a node to escape its defective partner.
Similarly, we plot the final fraction in the stationary state of cooperators C versus strategy
updating probability w with a diﬀerent set of cost-to-benefit ratio, u in Figure 5.6. Though not
perfect, AME in this case still yields more accurate prediction than PA. Hence, the AME method
improves the results PA could acquire in this figure.
5.3.3 Network Dynamics
After knowing the status in the stationary states, now we explore how the networks evolve. We
know there are two things happening to the networks: nodes change their states and the structure
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Figure 5.6: Fraction of cooperators versus strategy updating probability w with diﬀerent cost-to-
benefit ratio u values in stationary states. Markers are the averages of 1,000 simulations results,
dotted lines are the semi-analytical results of pair approximation (PA), and the dashed lines are the
semi-analytical results of approximate master equations (AMEs).
of the networks also change. To see how the networks change with time, we also investigate the
evolution of five fundamental quantities of the networks: C, D, CC, CD, and DD as in the previous
Chapter. And we compare the simulation results with the two semi-analytical approximations we
have. We choose a set of parameters u = 1 and w = 0.05. Since the time scale of PA and AME
are fixed in the diﬀerential equations, in order to keep our simulation results and semi-analytical
results on the same time scale, we carry out 100 updates at each time step in the simulations. In
this fashion, the three results will enjoy the same time scale as we show in Figure 5.7. To perform
the experiment, we do the 50 simulations and take the averages of them at each time step.
In this figure, since the initial fraction of defectors ⇢ is set to be 0.5, and we follow the Erdős-Rényi
G(N,M) random graph model, both C and D are 0.5, CC and DD are 0.25, and CD is 0.5 initially.
These are also the initial conditions of PA and parts of the initial conditions of AME. One thing
worth noticing is that the total amount of nodes and edges are constant during the evolution, as
both the fraction of C and D and the fraction of CC, CD, and DD should always be summed up
to be 1. The networks evolve as time goes by, and it stops evolving when there are no CD and DD
edges, i.e. when CD (the black markers) and DD (the magenta markers) both equal to zero. At the
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time soon after t = 200, the networks stops evolving and all five quantities keep constant after this
stopping time. The PA method in this case stops evolving before t = 10, and it gives the prediction
that the networks are dominated by defectors and their links, which is totally oﬀ. On the other
hand, the AME method stops evolving around t = 150, the black line goes to zero and other four
lines stay as constants. And the AME method gives us a fairly good estimation in this case. Not
only the AME method gives the correct order of these quantities, but during the evolution, the AME
method provides qualitatively correct trajectories of how these quantities change with time. For
example, the quantity of D first goes up and then goes down below the quantity of C. The AME
method could capture this phenomenon. Moreover, the AME method also knows that DD edges
would disappear before CD in this case. Hence comparing to PA, the AME method still works much
better in the second model.
In Figure 5.8, we compare the simulation results with the AME approximation. Since we know
the AME method does no worse than PA, we only focus on AMEs and simulation results comparison.
We choose the same four diﬀerent parameter sets as the previous Chapter here: u = 0.2, w = 0.1,
u = 0.2, w = 0.3, u = 0.5, w = 0.1, and u = 0.5, w = 0.3. In the case u = 0.2, w = 0.3 the AME
method is oﬀ, it predicts that ratio of C nodes would go to 0. However, in Figure 5.5, PA gives the
same wrong results too. This is a case when there are no C nodes for the network to have future
strategy updating and hence the network stops. In the other three cases, the AME method gives a
fairly accurate prediction of the final levels of these quantities. Moreover, throughout the evolution,
the AME method generates similar qualitatively correct curves as the simulation results. Hence,
not only do we have a better idea of the final level of these important quantities, but we can also
get qualitatively good evolution trajectories by plotting the AME trajectories while solving these
equations.
5.3.4 Degree Distribution
Here in Figure 5.9, we also plot the degree distribution of C and D nodes separately in the
stationary states and compare the simulation results with the AME approximations. In each case,
since we start with the Erdős-Rényi G(N,M) random graph model, the initial degree distribution
is approximately Poisson when the network size N is large enough. Here we only show the degree
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Figure 5.7: Evolution of five fundamental quantities versus time t when cost-to-benefit ratio u = 1
and strategy updating probability w = 0.05. We plot C (blue), D (red), CC (green), CD (magenta),
DD (black) ratios and compare these with two semi-analytical approximations. Markers are the
averages of 50 simulations results, dotted lines are the semi-analytical results of pair approximation
(PA), and the dashed lines are the semi-analytical results of approximate master equations (AMEs).
The dynamic stops evolving when there are no CD and DD edges, which happens around t = 220.
PA dynamics stop around t = 10, and it gives bad estimations. On the other hand, the AME method
provides better estimations of the simulation results.
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Figure 5.8: Evolution of five fundamental quantities versus time t in diﬀerent parameter sets, upper
left: u = 0.2, w = 0.1, upper right: u = 0.2, w = 0.3, lower left: u = 0.5, w = 0.1, and lower right:
u = 0.5, w = 0.3. We plot C (blue), D (red), CC (green), CD (magenta), DD (black) ratios and
compare these with our semi-analytical approximations. Markers are the averages of 50 simulations
results and the lines are the semi-analytical results of approximate master equations (AMEs). The
AME method provides qualitatively good estimations of the simulation results.
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distributions in the stationary states. We choose the same parameter sets as in the previous figure:
u = 0.2, w = 0.1; u = 0.2, w = 0.3; u = 0.5, w = 0.1; and u = 0.5, w = 0.3. Except the case u = 0.2
and w = 0.3, which AME goes oﬀ, the method yields really accurate prediction of C, D, CC, CD,
and DD levels as we shown in the figure. In the case u = 0.5, w = 0.3, not surprisingly, since it
predicts the evolution so well, the AME method also gives us a very good prediction of the final
degree distribution. In the stationary state of this case, D nodes dominate the whole network and
there are no C nodes.
The diﬀerence between the two models in the stationary distribution is as follows. In the case
when DD could also rewire, there would be no DD links unless the whole network is full of D
nodes. Hence, this makes D node in every edge extremely unfavorable, a lot of D isolated nodes are
generated, and they can’t change anymore. Therefore, in the case u = 0.2, w = 0.1, u = 0.2, w = 0.3,
and u = 0.5, w = 0.1, we see the only D nodes are isolated nodes and the AME method could
successfully capture this occurrence if it predicts the network evolution correctly.
5.3.5 Exploration of the Initial Fraction of Defectors, ⇢
Finally, we explore the eﬀect of the initial fraction of defectors parameter ⇢ in Figure 5.10 and
Figure 5.11. In these two figures, we fix the parameter w = 0.1 in Figure 5.10 and u = 0.2 in
Figure 5.11 and we change the other parameter u, and w, respectively, to see the final fraction of
cooperators against ⇢ in stationary states. And we compare the simulation results (markers) with
our AME approximation (lines). It is worth noting that in both figures, all the trajectories generated
by simulation and approximation results would pass through the upper left and the lower right
corners. This is because when ⇢ = 0, there is no D nodes in the networks, there is no discordant
edge, and the networks would not evolve. The final fraction of cooperators remains 100%. The final
cooperators is 0% for the similar reason in the case ⇢ = 1.
In Figure 5.10 for all u curves, the final fraction of cooperators would first gradually decrease
and drop to zero suddenly at diﬀerent values of ⇢, and the AME method generally captures this
qualitative behavior in diﬀerent levels of u. Moreover, fixing w = 0.1, smaller u results in higher
cooperative level, since the incentive of defecting is smaller when u is small. We also find out that
the AME method is more accurate when u is small in this figure.
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Figure 5.9: Degree distribution in the stationary states in diﬀerent parameter sets, upper left:
u = 0.2, w = 0.1, upper right: u = 0.2, w = 0.3, lower left: u = 0.5, w = 0.1, and lower right:
u = 0.5, w = 0.3. Bars are the averages of 50 simulations results and the lines are the semi-analytical
results of the approximate master equations (AMEs). AME provides qualitatively good estimations
of the simulation results. Blue bars and lines are degrees of cooperative nodes, and red bars and
lines are degrees of defective nodes.
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Figure 5.10: Fraction of cooperators versus the initial fraction of defectors ⇢ with strategy updating
probability w = 0.1 in stationary states. Diﬀerent cost-to-benefit ratio u: 0, 0.1, ..., 1 are chosen.
Markers are the averages of 50 simulations results and the dashed lines are the semi-analytical results
of approximate master equations (AMEs).
In Figure 5.11, fixing u = 0.2, the diagonal line is the case w = 0, there are no strategy updates
happening, hence the cooperative level remains the same during the evolution. The w curves drop to
zero more quickly when ⇢ increases, that means the strategy updating eﬀect is more sensitive to the
initial fraction of defectors ⇢. When w is large, the networks count more on the strategy updating
dynamics, and the final cooperative level drops to zero more quickly. As we show in this figure, the
AME curves suddenly drop to zero when w > 0.3. Although not very accurate, the AME method
still gives us qualitatively correct predictions of these scenarios. Moreover, the qualitative diﬀerence
between the two models is not too much.
5.4 Conclusion
We study a slightly diﬀerent dynamics as a partner switching evolutionary game model in
this Chapter. We explore the overall parameter space and see the combination eﬀect of the
parameter related to partner switching and strategy updating. Also in our work, we provide the
pair approximation (PA), the approximate master equations (AMEs) of the system, and get more
accurate approximations of the dynamics in the stationary states. Following the previous partner
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Figure 5.11: Fraction of cooperators versus the initial fraction of defectors ⇢ with cost-to-benefit
ratio u = 0.2 in stationary states. Diﬀerent w: 0, 0.1, ..., 1 are chosen. Markers are the averages of
50 simulations results and the dashed lines are the semi-analytical results of approximate master
equations (AMEs).
switching model, we also give a holistic investigation of the eﬀects of its parameters. We discuss how
to increase the final cooperative level and improve the existing method to approximate the network
dynamics. We show if we let DD edges could also rewire, this would increase the cooperation level
when strategy updating probability w is small. Moreover, the final state would be either a network
full of nodes with one state, or C nodes and D nodes coexist and all the D nodes are isolated. We
investigate the evolution of the dynamic and see how the AMEs could approximate this. We also use
the AME method to estimate the degree distributions of diﬀerent parameter sets in their stationary
states, which PA is not able to give this prediction. Furthermore, we explore the parameter ⇢, the
initial fraction of defectors and see how it aﬀects the final cooperative level and use the AME method
to estimate the dynamics.
.
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CHAPTER 6
Link-based Evolutionary Games on Complex Networks
The contents of this Chapter are theoretical extensions of the previous two Chapters. However, the
results here are still preliminary. We nevertheless include this Chapter in the thesis for completeness.
6.1 Model Description
We studied two partner switching models of evolutionary games on complex networks. In
these settings, each individual could either play cooperatively or defect against all of his or her
neighbors. However, this assumption is unrealistic compared to the availability and, indeed, the
probable preferability to behave diﬀerently to diﬀerent partners. In the models with node-based
states considered in the previous Chapters, if a person chooses to be cooperative, then he or she
needs to cooperate with all of the neighbors at the same time. On the other hand, if a person
chooses to be defective, then he or she needs to defect with all of the neighbors at the same time too.
This situation is contradictory to the observation we have in daily life where people form groups
to collaborate and defend themselves from other groups of people. Hence, an individual in a social
network should be able to cooperate with some people and defect with other people simultaneously.
The previous two models simply could not oﬀer this possibility since there are states attached to each
node and the node behaves accordingly. Previous research has studied playing diﬀerent strategies
with diﬀerent people, usually finding group formation in the society [8, 56, 102]; however, there
appears to have been little such work in the setting of typical complex networks.
In this Chapter, we want to extend the previous partner switching models to a link-based model.
That is, each individual could play diﬀerent strategies with diﬀerent neighbors based on the states of
their links, without restricting a node to behave the same way across all of its links. We want this
extended model to be as close as possible to our previous node-based model in order to compare and
contrast the models. On an adaptive network with a game, the vertices represent players and the
edges denote the pairwise partnership (game interaction) between individuals. We want to study
how players play a prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game with the ability to change strategies on each
individual link they have and switch partners.
We use a very similar setting to the node-based dynamics. Initially, individual strategies and
graphs start from a random and statistically homogeneous state. Each of N individuals has the
same expected number of interaction partners which are their neighbors on the network. The total
M edges uniformly pair the nodes up at random, and each node has an equal probability to be
a cooperator (C, denoted by two-dimensional unit vector s = [1, 0]T ) or defector (D, s = [0, 1]T )
associated with its end of each of its links. Note that a node here does not have its own state, instead,
it has diﬀerent states on its side of its edges (also known as ’stubs’). For example, say one node has
10 neighbors: 7 of its ends could be in state C and then the remaining 3 ends would be in state D.
Maintaining similarity with the models of the previous Chapters, the utility matrix is still
controlled by the parameter u, and the individual still has probability 1  w to switch a partner.
In each time step, we first randomly pick an edge that connects a pair of players with diﬀerent
strategies on the two ends of their link, i.e., a CD link denoted by Eij to update. With a given
probability w, stub i and stub j connected by the edge Eij update their strategies; otherwise, Eij is
rewired (with probability 1  w). When link Eij is rewired, the player with end state C unilaterally
gets rid of the partnership with its neighbor with end state D on the edge Eij . Suppose node i has
the end with state C, then it will randomly pick a player k from the remaining population as its
new partner, and player k would play a strategy on the new stub with probability matching its own
existing C and D ratio.
When one stub updates its strategy, the stub has probability   given by the Fermi function to
change its state. The payoﬀ matrix is again controlled by the cost-to-benefit ratio u as before. Two
chosen nodes would compare their overall utility, and the one selected probabilistically according to
the Fermi function to change its stub’s state selects its ’new’ state with probabilities in agreement
with the C and D ratios of the other node. Under this rule, it is possible that both stubs maintain
their current strategies after the strategy updating process.
This link-based partner switching evolution game model would stop evolving when there is no
discordant edge in the network. In the stationary state of the network, there would be no CD edges,
only CC and DD edges would exist.
97
CD
C
D
C
D
C
D
C
D
C
D
C
D
D
Figure 6.1: Visual depiction of the available information maintained in three diﬀerent levels of
analytical approximations — mean field (MF), pair approximation (PA), and approximate master
equation (AME) —, in link-based dynamical evolutionary games in a network setting.
6.2 Semi-analytical Methods
Figure 6.1 depicts diﬀerent levels of analytical approximation of the link based partner switching
model. In the mean field (MF) approximation, one only has local information of a node. To be more
specific, we use the information of a node’s degree and numbers of C and D stubs to form a set of
diﬀerential equations. In pair approximation (PA), one has the information of a node’s degree and
the pairs that node has. Lastly, in the approximate master equation (AME) method, one has the
overall information of nodes and their neighbors.
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6.2.1 Mean Field Approximation
Let Nk,mC denote the quantity of nodes with degree k and mC C-stubs. Then we have the
following Mean Field approximation.
dNk,mC
dt
= w ·
⇢
 Nk,mC ·mC ·
1
2NCD
NCC +
1
2NCD
·  D1!C1
+Nk,mC+1 · (mC + 1) ·
1
2NCD
NCC +
1
2NCD
·  D2!C2
 Nk,mC · (k  mC) ·
1
2NCD
NDD +
1
2NCD
·  C3!D3
+Nk,mC 1 · (k  mC + 1) ·
1
2NCD
NDD +
1
2NCD
·  C4!D4
 
+ (1  w)
⇢✓
Nk+1,mC (k + 1 mC) Nk,mC (k  mC)
◆
·
1
2NCD
NDD +
1
2NCD
+
NCD
N
✓
 Nk,mC +
mC   1
k   1 Nk 1,mC 1 +
k   1 mC
k   1 Nk 1,mC
◆ 
where
SC =
kmaxX
k=1
kX
mC=0
mC ·Nk,mC , SD =
kmaxX
k=1
kX
mC=0
(k  mC) ·Nk,mC
NCC = M · S
2
C
S2C + 2SCSD + S
2
D
, NCD = M · 2SCSD
S2C + 2SCSD + S
2
D
,
NDD = M · S
2
D
S2C + 2SCSD + S
2
D
, NCC +NCD +NDD = M
⇡k,mC = mC ·
NCC
NCC +
1
2NCD
+ (k  mC)

NDD
NDD +
1
2NCD
· u+
1
2NCD
NDD +
1
2NCD
· (1 + u)
 
⇡¯ =
total utility
N
=
2NCC + (1 + u)NCD + 2uNDD
N
The diﬀerential equation system above contains 2(kmax + 1)2 diﬀerential equations, where
kmax is the maximum degree a node can have in the network. Usually kmax depends on network
structure and the mean degree. Here we choose kmax = 50. We use these diﬀerential equations to
estimate the evolution of networks and solve their solutions numerically, arriving at a semi-analytical
approximation of the network evolution. To solve these hundreds of ODEs, the ode45 solver in
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MATLAB is used and we stop when all the solutions converge.
6.2.2 Pair Approximation
Let Nk,mCC ,mCD,mDC ,mDD denote the quantity of nodes with degree k, mCC CC links and so on,
and SC and SD are numbers of C stubs and Dstubs. Note that mDD is redundant.
Then we have the following pair approximation.
dNk,mCC ,mCD,mDC ,mDD
dt
= w·
⇢
Nk,mCC 1,mCD,mDC+1,mDD · (mDC + 1) ·  C1!D1
+Nk,mCC ,mCD+1,mDC ,mDD 1 · (mCD + 1) ·  D2!C2
 Nk,mCC ,mCD,mDC ,mDD ·
✓
mDC ·  C3!D3 +mCD ·  D4!C4
◆ 
+(1  w)·
⇢
 Nk,mCC ,mCD,mDC ,mDD ·
SC
SC + SD
·mCD
+Nk,mCC 1,mCD+1,mDC ,mDD ·
SC
SC + SD
· (mCD + 1)
 Nk,mCC ,mCD,mDC ,mDD ·mDC
+Nk+1,mCC ,mCD,mDC+1,mDD · (mDC + 1)
+
NCD
N

 Nk,mCC ,mCD,mDC ,mDD +Nk 1,mCC 1,mCD,mDC ,mDD
mCC   1 +mCD
k   1
+ Nk 1,mCC ,mCD,mDC 1,mDD
mDC   1 +mDD
k   1
  
The diﬀerential equation system above contains 2(kmax + 1)4 diﬀerential equations, where
kmax is the maximum degree a node can have in the network. Usually, kmax depends on network
structure and the mean degree. Here we choose kmax = 10. We use these diﬀerential equations to
estimate the evolution of networks and solve their solutions numerically, arriving at a semi-analytical
approximation of the network evolution. To solve these thousands of ODEs, the ode45 solver in
MATLAB is used and we stop when all the solutions converge.
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6.3 Numerical Results and Discussion
We study networks with N = 1, 000 nodes and M = 1, 000 edges and hence the mean degree of
the network is fixed to be hki = 2. We set the imitation parameter   in the Fermi function equal to
30. Initially, we start the networks to be drawn from an Erdős-Rényi G(N,M) random graph model,
that is, a network is chosen uniformly at random from the collection of all graphs which have N
nodes and M edges. Hence with large N , we could approximate the initial degree distribution of the
networks by the Poisson distribution,
pk =
hkike hki
k!
.
Moreover, we start from networks with 50% C stubs and 50 % D stubs distributed uniformly. We
perform Monte Carlo simulations of the evolution of the networks. In each time step, we select
and update a discordant edge. We define the unit time as 100 such updates for comparison with
our semi-analytical results below. In the case when only discordant edges (i.e., CD edges) are
updated, the dynamics will stop when there is no discordant edge or when it reaches our stopping
time t = 1, 000 (that is, 100,000 selections of discordant edges). We do the Monte Carlo simulations
100 times for each experiment.
The numerical simulations and the MF and PA approximations are provided in Figures 6.2 and
6.3. Note that now nodes do not have states, only edges have states. We plot the final ratio of CC
to the total edges in the stationary state against the cost-to-benefit ratio u.
As we can see in the two figures, the dynamics does not depend on u value much. In order to
perform a prisoner’s dilemma game, we need the cost-to-benefit ratio u 2 (0, 1) to keep the order in
the payoﬀ matrix. However, in this region of u, fixing the value of w, the final ratio of CC links with
diﬀerent w levels behave almost like a constant. If we posit rational players, then their objective is
to maximize the expected reward. Since the reward is aggregated linearly across edges, this means
maximizing the reward on each edge separately. In steady-state, given suﬃcient opportunities to
change strategy, it appears that the state of each stub of a node is eﬀectively independent of the
other stubs. Then what we see is the behavior is the same as if each node of degree were replaced
with independent nodes of degree 1. The cost-to-benefit ratio u simply does not play a role when
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Figure 6.2: Fraction of cooperators versus cost-to-benefit ratio u with diﬀerent w values in stationary
states. Markers are the averages of 100 simulations results and the dashed lines are the semi-analytical
results of mean field (MF) approximation (note that all 4 dashed lines for w < 1 combine under the
black dashed line at the value 1).
the action of each stub is eﬀectively independent.
In Figure 6.2, the MF approximation shows the dynamics is independent of the cost-to-benefit
ratio u. However, it does not give us a satisfying result. It predicts for the four cases of w < 1,
they all have the final CC level of 1. And for the case w = 1, it would stay on the 50 % of the CC
level in the stationary state. In Figure 6.3, the PA also shows the dynamics is independent of the
cost-to-benefit ratio u. However, this time, the order of the diﬀerent w level is wrong, opposite to
the trend observed in simulations. Both of the estimations are oﬀ, and we are not sure at this time
whether our equations are not correct or there exist glitches in our codes. But since the dynamics
does not depend on u, we think that perhaps we should come up with another link-based evolutionary
game which has a richer behavior in the future.
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Figure 6.3: Fraction of cooperators versus cost-to-benefit ratio u with diﬀerent w values in stationary
states. Markers are the averages of 100 simulations results and the dashed lines are the semi-analytical
results of pair approximation (PA).
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CHAPTER 7
Summary
In this thesis, we have investigated three distinct models of dynamics of coevolving networks.
Each of these models considers the eﬀects of distinct interaction mechanisms for the constituent
nodes. The evolution of the complex systems depends on the interaction mechanism in play. Not
only the network behavior itself is interesting, but also we could use mathematical approaches to
capture the fundamental phenomenon of these systems.
Clustering is one of the central properties of social networks, arising due to the ubiquitous
tendency among individuals to connect to friends of a friend, and can greatly impact a coevolving
network system. We study a voter model and the SIS epidemic model on a coevolving network with a
certain probability to close a triangle while rewiring, leading to reinforcement of network transitivity.
Under our new models, there is a probability that if a rewiring happens, a node would rewire to
its neighbors’ neighbor, a triangle is closed, and the local clustering increases. We show that this
new mechanism we establish would indeed fundamentally aﬀect the network dynamics, and lead to
diﬀerent qualitative and quantitative results. These models provide a unique opportunity to study
the role of transitivity in altering the voter model and the SIS dynamics on a coevolving network.
Social networks play an important role in spreading information and forming opinions. A voter
model on adaptive networks is a simplified model of a social network in which individuals have
one of two opinions and their opinions and the network connections coevolve. In Chapter 2, we
extend the method of approximate master equations to study our preferential attachment model and
gave an accurate prediction of the stationary states of the evolution as well as study the clustering
coeﬃcients and degree distribution in the consensus states.
Coevolving networks have been introduced in the context of disease propagation on complex
systems. In Chapter 3, we study disease propagation on coevolving networks and introduce a
simple social network model that has a certain probability to close a triangle while rewiring. By
using improved compartmental formalism method or method of approximate master equations, our
semi-analytical approximation could provide accurate predictions of disease prevalence and degree
distribution of networks in their stationary states. Furthermore, in the SIS model, we studied the
bifurcation diagrams and found out there exists a universal disease prevalence curve seemingly
independent of initial network topologies. More complicated rewiring methods based on the degree
of a node or an arbitrary distance from a node can be studied using similar semi-analytical methods.
Game theory is the study of strategic decision making and many investigations have taken place
on diﬀerent games played on random graphs and social networks. In Chapter 4 and 5, we bring more
sophisticated mechanisms into adaptive networks. We improve the existing pair approximation by
using approximate master equations, we study the model on diﬀerent dynamics, and finally, explore
the network structure of the stationary states. Then we extend the node-based evolutionary game
model to a link-based model in Chapter 6. In this setting, each node will not have to cooperate or
defect with all of his or her neighbors. This extended model gives us a more realistic scenario of the
real world dynamics. We provide diﬀerent level of approximation to study this model as well.
In the above models we study, the semi-analytical approximation could usually provide us
satisfying results. Using approximate master equations, we can approximate in detail how the
networks evolve. Although there are some limitations of the method we use, such as the tree-like
assumption, it is still better than many existing approaches. We study networks with diﬀerent
topology and see how this could aﬀect network dynamics, we explore the parameter spaces, investigate
the dynamics of some fundamental quantities of the networks, and predict degree distributions
in stationary states. With this analytical tool, we can provide a comprehensive estimation and
understanding of the network dynamics.
The voter model in Chapter 2 has an assumption that the two opinions "0" and "1" are
indistinguishable. Starting with the same initial fraction, the two opinions have the same probability of
dominating the final consensus state, or they can together form two matching segregated consensuses.
In Chapter 3, we break this symmetry between the two states, susceptible and infected individuals
now have diﬀerent probabilities to interchange their states, and the rewiring mechanism is also
diﬀerent depending on the states of nodes. Therefore, we no longer see symmetric arches in the voter
model, and instead, we see endemic and disease-free states in various settings of parameters. The
approximate master equations method is usually used in a situation that the transition probability
is fixed or dependent on local topology. Furthermore, in Chapter 4 and 5, the game theory model
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suggests a more complicated updating process. An individual needs to compare his or her utility
with neighbors and changes their strategies accordingly, and thus, we need information more than
ones’ neighbors have. The transition probability is no longer a fixed constant, but it depends on the
network topology and the specific game the model plays. To find a mathematical prediction of the
system’s overall behavior becomes a challenging but exciting mission.
In this thesis, we only study binary-state dynamics on coevolving networks, and surely with eﬀort
these approaches can generalize to multi-states networks. This extension will take an enormous
increase in the the number of diﬀerential equations and computational costs to study the dynamics.
However, we do think this field will be explored and more fascinating dynamics and complicated
behaviors could also be examined in the near future.
We developed simple network dynamics models that take into account a variety of diﬀerent
interaction rules. Furthermore, we provide mathematical methods to study the systems and often
give good approximations. However, with the growing availability of real-world network data recently,
it will be more important to test and corroborate these models. Specifically, temporal network
data, multilayer networks, and networks with metadata could all be very beneficial in improving our
knowledge of the dynamics of opinion formation, diseases propagation, and strategy development in
social networks and complex systems.
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APPENDIX A
Voter Model and Social Clustering on Complex Networks
This part of the joint work was led by my coauthors, Nishant Malik and Feng Shi. For the sake
of completeness, I include this in the thesis.
A.1 Evolution of Clustering in the model
Let TG be the number of triangles and ⌧G be the number of connected triplets of nodes (triads)
at a given time t in the network G. Then at time t clustering will be C(t) = 3TG/⌧G. Further, let us
consider a triad centered at a node j is represented by the notation ⌧ jG. Then the total number of
triads centered at j are given by
✓
kj
2
◆
, where kj is the degree of node j. If during the rewiring step
in the model a link is removed from a node j and rewired to a node m, then the number of triad
centered at j reduces by
✓
kj
2
◆
 
✓
kj   1
2
◆
and triads centered at m increases by
✓
km + 1
2
◆
 
✓
km
2
◆
.
Then the change in the number of triads in single rewiring step
 ⌧G =
✓
km + 1
2
◆
 
✓
km
2
◆
 
✓
kj
2
◆
+
✓
kj   1
2
◆
=)  ⌧G = km   kj + 1.
Assuming that node degree is an iid variable, then on average the change in number of triads in
time t will be h ⌧Gi = 1 (because hkmi = hkji = hki ). The amount rewiring at given time t
is proportional to probability of rewiring ↵ and number of discordant edges in the network l01.
Therefore, instantaneous rate of change of ⌧G will be ⌧˙G = ↵l01h ⌧Gi , that is
⌧˙G = ↵l01 (A.1)
Rewiring step also changes the number of triangles TG in the network. Let T ijG is the number of
triangles which include an edge i—j, if this edge is removed during the rewiring then T ijG triangles will
be eliminated. There are two types of triads involved with edge i—j, the one centered at node i i.e.,
⌧ iG = ki   1 and the other one centered at node j i.e., ⌧ jG = kj   1. Then the total number of triads
involved with edge i—j are ⌧ iG + ⌧
j
G = ki + kj   2. Not all of these triads are part of triangles T ijG ,
as to form one triangle only two triads involving edge i—j are required. Therefore, number of triads
involved in T ijG triangles must be (ki + kj   2)/2. We know clustering coeﬃcient is the fraction of
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triads that are involved in triangles, assuming independence and uniformity T ijG = C(ki + kj   2)/2.
This is the amount of triangles that will be eliminated in rewiring of i—j. Again assuming that
node degree is an iid variable, then on average the decrease in number of triangles in time t will
be h TGi =  C(hki   1) (because hkmi = hkji = hki ). In the presented model there also exist a
counter mechanism: rewiring to neighbor’s neighbor with probability  . If for simplicity we neglect
the special rare case of 4-cycles, then this step will increase number of triangle by 1. We can combine
these two mechanism into one equation and can write the instantaneous rate of change of TG as:
T˙G =  ↵l01C(hki   1) + ↵ l01 (A.2)
Using the definition C(t) = 3TG/⌧G, we can write
C˙ = 3 T˙G⌧G   TG⌧˙G
(⌧G)
2 (A.3)
When C˙ = 0 then T˙G⌧G   TG⌧˙G = 0, therefore
C = 3TG
⌧G
= 3
T˙G
⌧˙G
.
Implying,
C = 3 ↵l01C(hki   1) + ↵ l01
↵l01
(A.4)
or C =  3C(hki   1) + 3 , solving for C we get
C = 3 
3hki   2 . (A.5)
A.2 Degree Distribution
As rewiring is introduced into the model ↵ > 0, the structure of the network evolves. The degree
distribution for ↵ > 0 is described by the Weibull distribution. In Fig. A.2 we have plotted the scale
parameter b1 used to fit the b1 in Section 2.4.3. We observe bigger dispersion in the values of b1 for
small ↵’s (↵ = 0.2, 0.4). It is apparent that there are two regimes in the values of b1, one for ↵ < 0.6
and ↵ > 0.6. In the equation above the shape parameter is a constant therefore, larger the values of
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Figure A.1: Values of the parameter b1 in Section 2.4.3
b1 larger is the spread of the degree distribution. In other words neither the parameter ↵ nor the
parameter   are changing the basic shape of the distribution, their combination merely stretches or
contracts the spread of the degree distribution.
A.3 Transitions
The dynamics of discordant edges at time t, l01(t) is governed by
l01(t) = c1(1  n1(t))n1(t) + c2 (A.6)
where c1 and c2 are constants and n1 is the ratio of nodes holding opinion 1. c1 and c2 can be
estimated from the simulation data by fitting Eq. A.6 to it. The simulation data used to estimate c1
and c2 is shown in Figure 2.6 (a). We found that c1/c2 ⇠ ↵2.1 exp( 0.75 ) for ↵ < ↵c( ), where ↵c( )
is the solution of ↵2.1 exp( 0.75 ). In Figure A.2 we have plotted the ratio c1/c2 , we observe that for
↵2.1 exp( 0.75 ) < 0.5 all the values falls on same line with slope 1. Whereas for ↵2.1 exp( 0.75 ) > 0.5
the values fall on line with slope 0. There are only very few points which show some scattering from
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Figure A.2: In this figure we show that c1/c2 ⇠ ↵2.1 exp( 0.75 ) for ↵ < ↵c( ), where ↵c( ) is the solution of
↵2.1 exp( 0.75 ) = 0.5. The transition point is emphasized by grey dashed line. c1 and c2 were obtained by
fitting A.6 to the simulation data presented in Figure 2.6 (a).
this behavior, these points are due to numerical noise.
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